Service-topology harnesses

A harness can be a single process (Claude Code) OR a multi-service topology that acts on a target environment (browser/OS). Example: browser-use-langgraph = {agent-server (LangGraph; front-door), browser-mcp, action-stream} + {Postgres checkpoints, Redis stream, MinIO snapshots} + a per-case headful Chromium loading a client browser extension (the extension drives the browser).

Spec (HarnessSpec, kind: "service")

services[] (per-version warm; each {image?, port?, needs, env?, exec?} — env = per-service static config, e.g. MODEL/LOG_LEVEL/flags) · dependencies[] (shared store + isolateBy) · target (browser+extension, per-case) · frontDoor ({service, submit, trace}) · traceSource ({kind: otel|mlflow, endpoint}).

Host-exec services (exec: {kind: "host", command, artifact?}) — the portable no-Docker realization: the program runs directly on the node (Nomad raw_exec; the declared port is reserved, not dynamically mapped; artifact is fetched into the task dir pre-start). A host service omits image (the array-level validateServiceExec enforces the pairing; image pins on a host slot are rejected). K8s/Docker runtimes decline host services fail-fast (containers only). Capability-wise a topology needs docker only if it has at least one containerized service (topologyNeedsDocker), so a pure-host requires.os: windows topology places on any os-windows node — Docker no longer required — and self-hosted runners advertise os-windows/os-macos from their own platform. Service env precedence: store connEnv (conventional) < service.env (author) < runtime storeEnv (operator override) < dependencies[].inject (BYO store env names — rendered from the deployed store, nothing shadows it).

Dependency env injection (dependencies[].inject) — BYO store env names. The store-side sibling of service.wiring: an unmodified third-party image that reads its store connection under its own env keys (VALKEY_URL, OBJECT_STORAGE_ENDPOINT, …) declares, on the dependency, which keys it reads and how to compose them — inject: [{env: "VALKEY_URL", template: "valkey://{userinfo}{host}:{port}"}] (template unset = the canonical {url}). The {field} vocabulary is closed per store kind (STORE_INJECT_FIELDS in @everdict/contracts: postgres host/port/endpoint/url/user/password/userinfo/database, redis …/keyPrefix, minio …/accessKey/secretKey/bucket); an unknown field fails at registration (schema superRefine) AND at deploy (renderInjectTemplate, registry-bypassing paths). Values come from the structured coordinates of the store the runtime actually deployed (StoreValues — built where the endpoint is known: docker alias / K8s Service DNS at build time, Nomad discovered host:port, pool-minted per-tenant creds in planTenantStores.storeValues), so ONE mapping works unchanged across docker/nomad/k8s and pool/silo — a service.env literal can't even express pool creds (minted at deploy). A field the isolation model didn't mint renders empty ({userinfo} on an open silo redis → "" but "user:pw@" under pool) — that's what keeps one template portable across isolation models. Rendered topmost in the env merge by one shared pure renderer (dependencyInjectEnv, packages/topology/src/deploy/inject-env.ts) called by all three builders: a stale service.env literal shadowing the deployed store's coordinates is exactly the rupture this closes (the portability lint warns on such a dead literal — inject-shadowed-literal). isolateBy: "external" deps reject inject (Everdict deployed nothing — there are no coordinates); their connection stays storeEnv/env. Scoped by the dependency's existing service field (unset = every service).

Peer env interpolation. A service.env value may reference a needs peer's endpoint with a {{peer}} token — {{planner}} / {{planner.url}} → http://planner:8000, {{planner.host}} → the host, {{planner.port}} → the port (double-brace, same convention as the front-door bodyTemplate). interpolateServiceEnv resolves them one pass at deploy time where a peer's address is static — docker (network alias), co-located Nomad (loopback name), K8s (Service DNS) — since alias:port is known before deploy (no waves needed). Per-service (heterogeneous/scaled) Nomad has dynamic host ports, so a {{peer}} value is rendered into the discovery template file instead (consul-template resolves it from the Nomad-native catalog at runtime, re-resolving on reschedule — the same mechanism as EVERDICT_SVC_<PEER>). Referencing a peer not declared in needs (or one with no port) is a fail-fast BadRequestError; a {{token}} that names no declared service is left verbatim (it is the harness's own template). This is the declarative sibling of service.wiring (BYO env names): {{peer}} inlines the address into an author-controlled value, wiring fills a third-party image's expected var names. Both resolve to the same static address per runtime.

Planned — front-door generalization (design). Today ServiceTopologyBackend.dispatch is hardcoded to one protocol (browser-use-langgraph) in five places (fixed payload, fire-and-forget submit, trace-by-Everdict-runId, always-provisioned browser, fixed image). The direction to make the front-door harness-agnostic — a declarative FrontDoorProtocol + a thin FrontDoorDriver (the sibling of the infra-agnostic TopologyRuntime), with each hardcode becoming an optional knob defaulting to today's behavior — is captured in docs/architecture/front-door-generalization.md.

Efficiency (orchestrator-agnostic)

• stateless services → per-version warm pool
• Postgres/Redis/MinIO → shared, isolated per case by thread_id / key-prefix / object-prefix
• browser(+extension) → per-case fresh instance (headful + xvfb) — the only per-case unit
• per-run wiring (thread_id / stream_channel / minio_prefix / browser_cdp_url) is injected via the front-door POST /runs to the warm agent — not a redeploy.
• perRun = which per-run coordinates the default body carries by name. A per-version-warm service cannot take per-run env (no redeploy per case), so per-run coordinates travel through the front-door request, never the service env. When there is no bodyTemplate, the front-door service's perRun names are resolved from the per-run vocabulary (run_id / task / thread_id / stream_channel / minio_prefix / isolateBy vars / target_cdp_url …) and injected into the default body; a declared name the vocabulary can't deliver is a fail-fast config error (never a silent drop). A bodyTemplate is explicit — the author controls the body directly, so perRun is not injected there.
• Host model-gateway reachability. Every service container gets the host.docker.internal → host-gateway alias (Docker/DockerDriver --add-host; Nomad docker extra_hosts), so an agent that calls a host-local model gateway (LiteLLM etc.) reaches it portably on Linux too — matching Docker Desktop's built-in alias (the docker0 gateway 172.17.0.1 is often blocked by the host firewall). Point the agent at http://host.docker.internal:<port>. The target is configurable per runtime (hostGatewayAddr, gap 5): host-gateway (the Docker-CLI magic keyword) is the default, but a Nomad docker driver that doesn't translate it — and K8s, which has no docker host — take a concrete gateway IP (hostGatewayAddr: "172.17.0.1" → Nomad extra_hosts uses the IP; K8s adds a pod hostAliases entry, otherwise K8s adds none since the keyword isn't a valid hostAliases IP).

Orchestrator-agnostic (Nomad AND K8s)

ServiceTopologyBackend (a Backend) is orchestrator-agnostic; only TopologyRuntime differs:

• buildNomadTopologyJob(spec) → Nomad service job: one co-located task group (all services share a bridge netns → loopback comms), docker + runsc, a group dynamic host port per service (see below)
• buildK8sManifests(spec) → Deployments/Services (+ runtimeClassName gVisor) Register one ServiceTopologyBackend per target cluster in the BackendRegistry; Router/orchestrator unchanged.

NomadTopologyRuntime (live)

The live Nomad runtime (@everdict/topology) implements TopologyRuntime against the Nomad HTTP API:

• ensureTopology(spec) → register the warm service job, poll the one co-located group's alloc to running, and discover every service's endpoint from that single alloc (resolvePort(alloc, servicePortLabel(name)) reads AllocatedResources.Shared.Ports, falling back to Resources.Networks); cache per id@version so a version deploys once.
• provisionBrowserEnv(spec, runId) → register a per-case browser service job (headless Chromium), discover its CDP port, return a TargetEnvHandle whose wiring.target_cdp_url comes from /json/version and whose snapshot() reads /json/list. Registration failures are cleaned up (no leaked allocs); dispose()/teardown() purge. (The handle is a bag of named coordinates now, not a single cdpUrl — see target.acquire below.)
• Co-located, loopback comms (Nomad only). All services are one task group sharing a bridge netns, so peers talk over localhost:<svc.port> (fixed, never stale on reschedule — the whole topology reschedules atomically); extra_hosts also maps each service name → 127.0.0.1 for <svc.name>:<port> docker/k8s parity. Each ported service still gets a group dynamic host port (label = its sanitized name) so the control plane can reach it, no Consul. Shared netns ⇒ ports must be unique (BadRequestError on a collision); per-service replicas is ignored. This ports the Docker runtime's fixed internal-address model to Nomad and fixes the old per-service-group model's stale-address fetch failed. See docs/architecture/nomad-colocated-topology.md.

K8sTopologyRuntime (live)

The live K8s runtime is the same shape against the Kubernetes API (via an injectable Kubectl, default shells to kubectl):

• ensureTopology(spec, zone) → ensureNamespace (per-tenant namespace = the isolation boundary) → apply buildK8sManifests (Deployment + Service per service) → kubectl rollout status → discover endpoints via kubectl port-forward svc/… :<port> (kubectl picks the local port; the runtime parses it from stdout). Cached per (id, version, zone).
• provisionDependencies (option) → also brings up the declared dependencies[] (postgres/redis) as Deployment+Service from a standard store registry (STORE_DEFS: postgres:16-alpine/redis:7-alpine), one per store type per (harness-version, zone) — shared across that harness's cases, isolated per case by isolateBy (thread_id / key-prefix). Stores roll out before the services (services connect on boot) and the services' env is auto-wired with connection URLs (DATABASE_URL, REDIS_URL/REDIS_URI) pointing at the in-cluster Service DNS — no port-forward needed (in-cluster). An explicit storeEnv overrides the auto-wired vars (for harness-specific variable names). This is what lets a real stateful harness (aegra needs PG+Redis) deploy via the runtime, not just point at an external endpoint.
• provisionBrowserEnv(spec, runId, zone) → buildBrowserManifests (headless-Chromium Deployment + Service) → rollout → port-forward CDP → TargetEnvHandle. dispose() deletes only the browser Deployment/Service (the warm topology in the same namespace survives); teardown() deletes the namespace.
• Tenant isolation is K8s-native: each zone is its own namespace, so two tenants on the same harness version get separate Deployments. runtimeClass (gVisor) and imagePullPolicy are runtime options.

Multi-tenant store isolation — pool / silo / external (TrustZone.storeIsolation)

A real multi-tenant SaaS can't just bolt a dedicated store onto every tenant×harness — that explodes the instance count. And the per-case isolateBy (thread_id / key-prefix) is not a tenant boundary — it isolates one tenant's own cases from each other. The tenant boundary is the database / role / credentials (+ network). So there are three isolation layers, nested: physical store fleet → per-tenant logical namespace → per-case isolateBy. TrustZone.storeIsolation selects the model (the AWS SaaS-lens silo/pool framing):

• pool (default for trusted zones) — one platform-managed shared PG/Redis (deployed once per cluster in everdict-shared), with per-tenant logical isolation: Postgres gets a dedicated tenant_<zone> database
  • a non-superuser r_<zone> role (and REVOKE CONNECT … FROM PUBLIC, so other tenants' roles are refused); Redis gets an ACL user scoped to ~t:<zone>:*. MinIO (object store / snapshots) gets a per-tenant access key + a tenant-<zone> bucket + an IAM policy scoping that key to only its bucket (minted via mc, which the minio server image bundles). The service is injected with scoped creds (DATABASE_URL with the tenant role+db, REDIS_URL/REDIS_KEY_PREFIX, AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID/AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY/S3_BUCKET). The hot path mints only cheap logical objects (DB/role/ACL/bucket) — it never spins up a store engine per run. This is "shared infra, minimally managed for performance, logically isolated per trust-zone."
• silo (default for untrusted/compliance zones) — a dedicated store instance per zone (SLICE 39's provisionDependencies in the zone namespace). Strong blast-radius containment for hostile arbitrary code; higher cost. Use when logical isolation isn't enough.
• external — BYO endpoint via storeEnv; Everdict deploys no store.

Per-dependency isolateBy: "external" (spec-level BYO declaration)

The deploy-time storeIsolation: "external" above is zone-wide. A single dependency can ALSO be declared external in the HarnessSpec itself: { store, role, isolateBy: "external", service? }. This declares a store the harness just connects to (a different cluster's shared redis/minio/postgres) — Everdict does not deploy or per-case-isolate it, and the connection comes from deploy-time env/storeEnv, not the spec (provisioning-agnostic). The runtime excludes external deps from provisioning + wiring (dependencyStores skips them → no container, no connEnv; wiringVars makes no isolation variable). The point is visibility: declaring it (instead of burying the connection in services[].env) surfaces the store as a first-class node in the topology diagram + structure spec. The optional service names which service uses the store (drives the diagram's service→store edge; unset = topology-wide).

Default when a zone doesn't set it: trusted → pool, untrusted → silo; an explicit storeIsolation overrides. Password minting is HMAC(secret, zone:store) — deterministic (idempotent re-provision); production sources the secret from a KEK/Vault and would store minted creds. The pure planner is planTenantStores(spec, zone) (@everdict/topology); K8sTopologyRuntime executes it (shared-store deploy-once → tenant DDL/ACL via kubectl exec into the admin pod → scoped env into services).

Verified live on kind (scripts/live/pool-isolation-k8s.mjs): one shared PG, zones acme+globex each got tenant_acme/tenant_globex + r_acme/r_globex; r_acme creds → tenant_globex = DENIED, own DB = OK — i.e. even hostile tenant code holding its own creds cannot reach another tenant's data (PG auth + CONNECT-revoke enforce the boundary). The shared store deploys once across both tenants. (NetworkPolicy denying cross-tenant store reach is a complementary hardening layer, not yet wired; the proof here is the PG-auth boundary.)

Orchestrator-agnostic (K8s + Nomad parity). planTenantStores is orchestrator-neutral — the only difference is the store endpoint: K8s uses a stable Service DNS (build-time), Nomad has no DNS without Consul so the runtime discovers the alloc host:port and injects it (opts.storeEndpoint). NomadTopologyRuntime mirrors the K8s pool path: deploy a shared-store Nomad service job (everdict-shared-stores, deploy-once) → discover host:port via resolvePort → mint per-tenant DB/role/ACL via nomad alloc exec (the kubectl-exec analog) → inject scoped creds into the topology job's service env. Verified live on nomad agent -dev (scripts/live/pool-isolation-nomad.mjs): same result — one shared PG, acme creds → tenant_globex = DENIED, own DB = OK. So pool multi-tenant store isolation holds identically on both orchestrators.

Silo on Nomad uses the same discover-then-inject path minus the DDL: buildDedicatedStoreJob renders a per-zone dedicated store job (everdict-store-<harness>-<zone>), the runtime discovers its host:port and injects the default-creds connection env into the services (the whole instance is the tenant's — no per-tenant DB needed). Verified live (scripts/live/silo-isolation-nomad.mjs): zones acme+globex each got a distinct dedicated PG instance (different host:ports), services wired to the discovered endpoint, both reachable — physical isolation. So store isolation is at full parity across {pool, silo} × {K8s, Nomad}.

All three declared store types (postgres / redis / minio) are provisionable. MinIO pool isolation verified live on kind (scripts/live/minio-pool-k8s.mjs): one shared minio, zones acme+globex each got a per-tenant access key + tenant-<zone> bucket + a bucket-scoped IAM policy; acme's key → tenant-globex bucket = DENIED, own bucket = OK. So a tenant's object snapshots are isolated by minted S3 credentials, same model as the PG/Redis pool.

Network isolation — NetworkPolicy (TrustZone.network)

Per-tenant DB credentials (pool) stop a tenant from reading another tenant's data, but a hostile harness pod could still reach other tenants' pods or scan the shared store at the network layer. TrustZone.network (declared since the trust-zone slice, now enforced) drives K8s NetworkPolicies, generated by buildZoneNetworkPolicies / buildSharedStoreIngressPolicy (@everdict/topology) and applied by K8sTopologyRuntime:

• deny-cross-tenant (default) — a zone-namespace ingress policy allowing only same-namespace sources. Because it's applied symmetrically to every zone, tenant A cannot initiate a connection into tenant B's namespace — cross-tenant pod-to-pod is blocked regardless of egress.
• deny-egress — adds an egress policy restricting outbound to DNS (kube-dns :53) + same-namespace + the shared-store namespace (pool) + an explicit egressAllowCIDRs allow-list (e.g. the model endpoint) — blocks data exfiltration to the internet.
• open — no policies.

The shared store namespace (pool) gets an ingress policy allowing only everdict-managed namespaces (label everdict/managed=true, set on every namespace the runtime creates) on the store ports — so nothing outside the platform can reach the store. kubectl port-forward (endpoint discovery / front-door submit) is unaffected: it goes control-plane → kubelet → pod-netns localhost, bypassing the CNI policy.

Enforcement needs a policy-CNI — kindnet (the default kind CNI) ignores NetworkPolicy, so the policies are unit-tested for correctness and verified live on a dedicated Calico kind cluster (everdict-np). Verified (scripts/live/network-isolation-k8s.mjs): (A) acme pod → globex echo service = BLOCKED, same-namespace = reachable; (B) acme (managed) → shared PG = reachable, a rogue non-managed namespace → shared PG = BLOCKED. So with a policy-CNI the tenant network boundary holds end-to-end; on a non-enforcing CNI the policies are applied but inert (same honesty as runsc/gVisor not being installed on kind).

Nomad — data-plane enforce status. The decision layer is proven (intentions, below). For the actual Envoy data-plane block, the prerequisites are now satisfied and scripted (scripts/live/connect-enforce-nomad.mjs): buildNomadTopologyJob({connect:true}) / buildConnectService render Connect-enabled jobs (bridge + sidecar + upstreams), and the mesh stands up on a Nomad client running as root (Connect bridge needs root for iptables) against a Consul exposing gRPC/xDS (the shared workclaw Consul has gRPC off, so a self-contained consul agent -dev is used) — Envoy sidecars deploy healthy, services register, apps are reachable in-netns. A clean allow/deny differential at the data plane was not yet demonstrated: the probe's upstream routing reset for all destinations (a blanket reset isn't proof of enforcement), and the distroless Envoy image lacks curl/wget to introspect /clusters directly. Root-caused by querying Envoy's admin from the probe's main task (shared netns): xDS is fine — both upstream clusters carry healthy endpoints and the bind listeners are up — but Nomad registers the Connect sidecar at ServiceAddress: 127.0.0.1 (loopback). From another alloc's bridge netns, 127.0.0.1 is its own loopback, so the upstream can't reach the destination sidecar (the consul NodeAddr was made routable, but the service address stays loopback). This is a single-node dev address- advertisement limitation — cross-alloc Connect needs a node-routable Consul client agent (production Nomad+Consul supplies this); it is not a flaw in the model, the builder, or the enforcement mechanism (xDS + intentions both work). So the authoritative network-isolation proof remains the Consul-intention decision —

Consul Connect intentions (service-identity authz) are the Nomad analog of NetworkPolicy. buildTenantIntentions (@everdict/topology) emits a service-intentions config entry per tenant service: Sources = [allow each same-tenant mesh service, deny *]. Consul evaluates by precedence (exact name > *), so a service in another tenant matches only the * deny — per-destination deny-by-default without touching global Consul config. The shared store gets an allow * intention (mesh-only; tenant isolation is the DB creds). Mesh service names are t-<zone>-<svc>; NomadTopologyRuntime (given a consul client) applies the intentions in ensureTopology + the store intention in ensureSharedStores, and cleans them up in teardown.

Co-location note. Since the co-located-topology change, a tenant's services share one netns and reach each other over loopback — there is no inter-service mesh hop for intentions to govern, so buildNomadTopologyJob no longer wires per-service Connect sidecars/upstreams. Cross-tenant isolation is the per-(spec,version,zone) job/namespace/netns separation; the intentions above remain as the cross-tenant authorization decision (defense-in-depth, and the policy for a Connect-enabled external front-door gateway if operated). buildConnectService stays as the standalone building block for the live enforcement proof. See docs/architecture/nomad-colocated-topology.md.

Verified live against a real Consul (Connect CA on; scripts/live/consul-intentions-nomad.mjs) using Consul's /v1/connect/intentions/check API — the authoritative allow/deny decision the Envoy mesh enforces: same-tenant acme-mcp → acme-agent = ALLOWED, cross-tenant acme-agent → globex-agent = DENIED, tenant → shared store = ALLOWED, rogue → globex-agent = DENIED. So the authorization decision is proven; full data-plane enforcement additionally needs the service jobs to be Connect-enabled (Envoy sidecars + network bridge + connect { sidecar_service {} }) — the remaining follow-up, the Nomad analog of "needs a policy-CNI" on K8s. So both store-level and network-level isolation are now at parity on K8s (NetworkPolicy) and Nomad (Connect intentions), each verified at the decision/enforcement layer their platform exposes.

Trace (@everdict/trace)

The harness emits a trace to OTel/MLflow; Everdict pulls it: OtelTraceSource / MlflowTraceSource → spansToTraceEvents → normalized TraceEvent[] (OTel GenAI semantic conventions). spansToTraceEvents reads OTel GenAI keys (gen_ai.request.model, gen_ai.usage.input_tokens/output_tokens/cost) and MLflow-native fallbacks (mlflow.llm.model, mlflow.chat.tokenUsage, mlflow.llm.cost) — so both OTel-instrumented and MLflow-autolog spans map to llm_call/tool_call.

Real MLflow span ingestion — live ✅. Verified against a real MLflow 3.11 backend (Basic auth) with scripts/live/mlflow-trace-ingest.mjs (+ mlflow-emit-trace.py): emit a browser-use-shaped trace (agent → LLM → tool spans) to MLflow → MlflowTraceSource.fetch(trace_id) pulls it via GET /api/3.0/mlflow/traces/get?trace_id= (returns {trace:{spans}}; MLflow normalizes gen_ai → mlflow.chat.tokenUsage/mlflow.llm.model) → TraceEvent[] = llm_call(model gpt-5.4-mini, in 42/out 7 tokens, $) + tool_call(browser.navigate) → steps/cost graders score the real trace. This closes the stand-in's empty-trace gap: the eval runtime now grades real agent trajectories pulled from a real trace backend.

Real OTel/Jaeger span ingestion — live ✅. OtelTraceSource now auto-detects the response shape: a real Jaeger query (GET /api/traces/{id} → {data:[{spans}]}, tags pre-typed, μs times) via parseJaegerSpans, or an OTLP-native {spans:[…]} via parseOtlpSpans. Verified against Jaeger 1.62 (all-in-one, OTLP receiver) with scripts/live/otel-trace-ingest.mjs (+ otel-emit-trace.py, real OTel SDK → OTLP/HTTP): emit a browser-use-shaped trace → OtelTraceSource.fetch(trace_id) → llm_call(gpt-5.4-mini, 42/7 tokens, $) + tool_call(browser.navigate) → steps/cost graded. So both trace backends — MLflow 3.x and OTel/Jaeger — are live-validated for ingestion + grading.

Inline trace (no observability platform) — frontDoor.traceInline

Not every agent emits to OTel/MLflow. When a service harness sets frontDoor.traceInline: { path?: "trace" }, the agent returned its step trace as a normalized TraceEvent[] inside the front-door response body (the sentinel / result channel — the trace sibling of the sentinel observation), and ServiceTopologyBackend extracts it from outcome.response (dot-path, or the whole body) via extractInlineTrace instead of pulling from traceSource. So a simple agent that returns { output, trace: [...] } gives the judge its action steps with zero platform wiring; each element is validated against TraceEventSchema, and a malformed body is downgraded to a non-fatal error event (same "trace is secondary" policy as a fetch failure). Unset = pull from the platform traceSource (current).

Inline t semantics — milliseconds from the drive's start. An inline event's at (absolute ISO instant) is always preferred when the agent stamps it; when it doesn't, its relative t is read as ms offsets from the moment the front-door drive was submitted. The backend declares that anchor on the result (CaseResult.traceT0 = drive start), the sealer stores it as the execution segment's t0, and the trajectory viewer uses it to lay the agent's steps on the same wall-clock axis as the placement marks — without it, a relative-t inline trace drew at the run's first instant, overlapping the deploy phase it actually followed.

Grading (browser/service)

Over {trace, snapshot} (no ComputeHandle): trace-based (steps/cost/latency), browser-outcome (dom-contains, url-matches — read the BrowserSnapshot), and model judge (JudgeGrader — LLM/VLM over task + DOM/screenshot, via an injected Judge). Cases pick graders via EvalCase.graders (resolved by makeGraders); judge graders are wired where a Judge is configured.

Trace-source failures don't kill the run. The browser snapshot is the primary signal in a service topology; the trace is secondary. So ServiceTopologyBackend.dispatch wraps traceSource.fetch in a guard: a fetch failure (auth, transient down, harness emitted no spans) is recorded as a single error TraceEvent (visible, not silently lost) and grading proceeds over the snapshot. This is why the K8s/kind live e2e completes end-to-end even when the stand-in front-door emits no GenAI spans and MLflow rejects the pull.

Target acquisition (target.acquire) — pluggable (round 2)

How the per-case target env is acquired is the WHAT-target seam (TargetAcquirer, the fourth sibling of TopologyRuntime/FrontDoorDriver/ObservationSource). TopologyTarget.acquire (@everdict/contracts) selects it; absent = provision (today). The per-case handle is a TargetEnvHandle { wiring: Record<string,string>; snapshot; dispose } — a bag of named coordinates (not one cdpUrl), merged into the per-run wiring so a bodyTemplate can reference any of them ({{playwright_server_url}}, {{session_id}}, …).

• provision (default) — the runtime spins a per-case browser container and returns wiring:{ target_cdp_url } (today's behavior, byte-identical).
• service — the target is provided by a declared topology service's session API; no Everdict-owned container. targetAcquirerFor routes to serviceAcquirer: open (e.g. POST /sessions) opens a session, coordinates (wiring-name → response dot-path) maps fields into the wiring bag, and close (e.g. DELETE /sessions/{session_id}) tears it down on dispose() ({var}-interpolated with the coordinates). Observation comes via delivery (sentinel/egress) or a {kind:"prompt"} trace-only snapshot. A coordinate-mapping failure best-effort-closes the half-open session (no leak — same discipline as the topology cleanup-on-failure). Add cdpBase (a dot-path into the open response) to make the session's browser watchable: it must be an address the CONTROL PLANE can reach, unlike the agent-facing coordinates, and it is what turns on the environment recorder (network/console/nav + screencast, replay ②) and GET /runs/:id/screen for this case. Optional and best-effort — a session that returns no such address still runs, it just cannot be watched.

See docs/architecture/target-acquisition-generalization.md.

Observation delivery (target.delivery) — pluggable

How the observation reaches the grader/judge is a seam (ObservationSource, the HOW-observe sibling of TopologyRuntime/FrontDoorDriver). TopologyTarget.delivery (@everdict/contracts) selects the mode; absent = reference (today). dispatch calls observationSourceFor(spec.target?.delivery?.mode ?? "reference"):

• reference (store-fetch) — pull the provisioned target's snapshot() (or a {kind:"prompt"} snapshot when there's no target). The locality-sensitive mode — pairs with judge co-location (run the judge near the store).
• sentinel — the run returns the observation inline via the result channel (the front-door HTTP response; topology analog of the __EVERDICT_RESULT__ sentinel) — no store hop. DriveOutcome.response carries the completion body (sync = submit response, poll = the done status body); delivery.path? is a dot-path into it (absent = whole body), validated as an EnvSnapshot (malformed → explicit run failure). Best for small observations.
• egress — the agent pushes the observation to a named sink (out of band) and Everdict retrieves it from there (vs reference pulling Everdict's own provisioned target). The sink is a {run_id}-interpolated URL GET'd via the backend's getJson (keyed by outcome.traceRef, matching the trace correlation), validated as an EnvSnapshot. For a harness that produces+ships its own result and exposes no CDP.

Pairs with judge placement/store-locality — see docs/architecture/judge-placement-locality.md (this is its slice 2).

Live validation (Nomad)

scripts/live/service-topology-nomad.mjs runs a full service-topology case on a real Nomad cluster: warm front-door deployed as a Nomad service job → endpoint discovered from the alloc → per-case headless Chromium provisioned with a real CDP endpoint → real POST /runs with per-run wiring (verified by the front-door's HTTP 200) → trace pulled from real MLflow → dom-contains/url-matches graded over the real browser snapshot → both jobs purged on teardown. Confirmed end-to-end (~6s) on Nomad v2.0.3 dev (docker driver) with stand-ins: front-door = mendhak/http-https-echo, browser = chromedp/headless-shell.

NOMAD_ADDR=http://127.0.0.1:4646 MLFLOW_ENDPOINT=http://127.0.0.1:5501 \
  node scripts/live/service-topology-nomad.mjs

Live validation (Kubernetes / kind)

scripts/live/service-topology-k8s.mjs runs the same case on a real K8s cluster via K8sTopologyRuntime: namespace-per-tenant (everdict-acme) → Deployment+Service applied → rollout → endpoint via port-forward → per-case headless-Chromium with a real CDP endpoint → real POST /runs (HTTP 200) → MLflow trace → dom/url graded over the real browser snapshot → namespace deleted on teardown. Confirmed end-to-end (~3s) on a local kind cluster — proving Nomad↔K8s parity through the orchestrator-agnostic ServiceTopologyBackend.

Local kind cluster (persistent, for experiments)

# one-time: kubectl + kind to ~/.local/bin, then
kind create cluster --name everdict
# load the stand-in images into the kind node (its own containerd; no registry needed)
kind load docker-image mendhak/http-https-echo:latest chromedp/headless-shell:latest --name everdict
PATH=$HOME/.local/bin:$PATH node scripts/live/service-topology-k8s.mjs

The cluster persists across runs (kind get clusters); kind delete cluster --name everdict to remove. gVisor (runtimeClass) is not installed on kind, so the demo uses the default runtime; namespace isolation is real.

Status

• Phase 1 (built, unit-tested): HarnessSpec(service), OTel/MLflow trace mappers, both topology builders (Nomad + K8s), env-manager runId keying, orchestrator-agnostic ServiceTopologyBackend (mock runtime).
• Phase 2 — live NomadTopologyRuntime AND K8sTopologyRuntime: DONE (real apply + endpoint discovery + per-case CDP browser + drive + MLflow pull + grade + teardown on both Nomad and K8s/kind; see above — Nomad↔K8s parity through the same ServiceTopologyBackend). Real MLflow AND OTel/Jaeger span ingestion: DONE (live vs MLflow 3.11 + Jaeger 1.62 — see Trace section). Real browser-use library: live ✅ (completes a real task end-to-end, 4/4 runs — see below). Still pending: the real browser+extension (headful + xvfb + --load-extension), the harness images + extension registry, and wiring browser-use's own OTel trace through the (now-live) ingestion pipeline.

Real browser-use library — live ✅ (scripts/live/browser-use-agent.py + browser-use-grade.mjs)

The actual OSS browser-use 0.13.1 (autonomous multi-step browser agent) runs against Everdict's infra: it connects to our per-case CDP browser (chromedp/headless-shell, BrowserSession(cdp_url=…)) and uses our model (gpt-5.4-mini via LiteLLM, OpenAI-compatible, ChatOpenAI(base_url, api_key)), DOM-only (use_vision=False). Verified live (4/4 runs, ~15s each): the agent autonomously navigates to https://example.com, extracts the h1 ("Example Domain"), and finishes (done=true, 2 steps); browser-use-grade.mjs grades the outcome (agent-done / browser-navigated / answer-contains all pass).

Note: an earlier run-batch hit per-call timeouts and was mis-reported as "LLM too slow." Re-measuring proved that wrong — direct completions are ~2 s with reasoning_tokens=0, and browser-use completes reliably (4/4). The earlier failures were a transient LiteLLM latency spike (occasional calls hung >200 s during that window), not a fundamental limit. browser-use's per-call llm_timeout aborts a step when a call exceeds it, and enough aborted steps end the run — so a latency spike can fail a run, but the steady-state endpoint is fast.

Dataset-driven evaluation — user-owned datasets, WebVoyager e2e ✅

The full eval loop on a real browser benchmark, through the multi-tenant, user-owned dataset path — since in a SaaS the user creates + owns datasets in their workspace.

Tenant-owned dataset model (already in place): Dataset (@everdict/contracts: id, version, cases: EvalCase[], harness-independent, version-immutable) → DatasetRegistry (@everdict/registry, InMemory + PgDatasetRegistry, tenant-scoped with _shared fallback for first-party benchmarks, version-immutable) → everdict_datasets(tenant, id, version, dataset jsonb) (migration 0005) → API POST/GET /datasets (gated datasets:write/read, principal.workspace-scoped) → web register-dataset feature. So a user registers + owns + versions datasets in their workspace, isolated per tenant.

The gap that was missing — format ingestion (@everdict/datasets, new): users have benchmarks in external formats (WebVoyager JSONL, CSV, HF), not the Everdict Dataset(EvalCase[]) schema. @everdict/datasets converts them: importWebVoyager (preset: web→env.startUrl, ques→task, answer→answer-match{expect}, +steps), importJsonl/importCsv (a generic CaseMapping for arbitrary field names). Output is a validated Dataset → DatasetRegistry.register(tenant, …). This is how a user easily adds their own dataset.

e2e (scripts/live/webvoyager-eval.mjs): importWebVoyager(jsonl) → registry.register(tenant) (user-owned) → registry.get(tenant, id, ver) → Suite → runSuite(dispatch = real browser-use per case) → makeGraders (answer-match vs the benchmark reference + steps) → Scorecard → ScorecardStore (tenant-scoped). Full WebVoyager = 15 commercial sites + VLM grading, so the runnable subset (datasets/webvoyager-mini.jsonl, same format) uses accessible factual tasks; the importer runs the full WebVoyager_data.jsonl unchanged (DATASET=…). Verified live (3/3): the agent autonomously browsed each site and answered (example.com → "Example Domain", Wikipedia → "1991", HTTP "404" → "Not Found"); answer_match passRate = 100%, Scorecard stored for the tenant.

Version-regression diff (scripts/live/webvoyager-diff.mjs): the same tenant-owned dataset evaluated on two harness versions → two Scorecards (stored) → diffScorecards reports objective pass-transitions. Verified: browser-use@0.13.1 (100%) → 0.14.0-rc (33%) ⇒ 2 regressions detected (the Wikipedia cases pass→fail). (The diff demo uses deterministic harness stand-ins so the regression is reproducible — real LLM runs are non-deterministic; the real-harness eval is webvoyager-eval.mjs.)

Benchmark ecosystem — sourcing from where benchmarks live (HuggingFace Hub) ✅

A SaaS user doesn't just want to upload one file — they want to keep up with the diverse + continuously-released benchmark ecosystem (WebVoyager, GAIA, SWE-bench, WebArena, Mind2Web, OSWorld, …, plus whatever ships next month). A single hard-coded importer can't scale to that, because benchmarks vary on four axes: source (HF Hub / GitHub / URL), format (HF rows/parquet, jsonl, csv), task/env (browser, QA, coding, tool), and grading (exact / VLM-judge / test-execution / state-checker). @everdict/datasets now covers the first three with two pieces:

• Source connector — HuggingFace Hub (fetchHfRows): pull a benchmark by reference only (dataset + config + split) via the HF datasets-server REST /rows (paginated; no Python). gated benchmarks (e.g. GAIA) take an Authorization: Bearer <token> — the per-tenant HF token comes from the existing SecretStore, so isolation is reused, not reinvented.
• Benchmark adapter + catalog (BenchmarkAdapter, BENCHMARK_CATALOG): a benchmark = a small descriptor {source, mapping (fields→EvalCase), graders, rowTransform?}. Adding a new benchmark = one adapter, not code. First-party adapters ship in the catalog (seeded into _shared); a user adds their own adapter for a private/new benchmark. importBenchmark(adapter, meta, {limit, token}) → fetch → map → validated Dataset → DatasetRegistry.register(tenant).

Verified live (scripts/live/hf-benchmark-eval.mjs, real HF network): catalog lists 4 first-party benchmarks → openai/gsm8k (QA) pulled by ID (5 real rows, …#### N final-answer extracted via rowTransform) → tenant dataset → eval → answer_match passRate 100%, Scorecard stored; osunlp/Mind2Web (web-agent, no final answer → steps) pulled by ID (3 real tasks) → tenant dataset; gaia-benchmark/GAIA (gated) → token path confirmed (skipped without HF_TOKEN). So a user picks a benchmark from the catalog (or names any HF dataset), and it becomes a tenant-owned Dataset ready to evaluate — the ingestion side of "bring any/new benchmark", end-to-end.

Self-service over API + web ✅

The catalog + import are exposed so users self-serve (no live script): the control plane has a BenchmarkService (catalog list + importBenchmark → DatasetRegistry.register(tenant); gated benchmarks read HF_TOKEN from the tenant SecretStore) behind GET /benchmarks (gated datasets:read) and POST /benchmarks/import (gated datasets:write). The web dashboard adds an Add benchmark action (/dashboard/datasets/import): pick a catalog benchmark (with source/gated/category shown), set version + a row limit for HF benchmarks, paste jsonl for source: jsonl benchmarks (e.g. WebVoyager), import → it lands as a tenant-owned dataset. Versions are immutable (re-import of a differing (id, version) → 409).

Verified live (real API process + real HF): GET /benchmarks returns the 5 first-party adapters with source/gated; POST /benchmarks/import {benchmark: "gsm8k", limit: 3} pulls real GSM8K rows over HTTP and GET /datasets/gsm8k/versions/1.0.0 then shows the registered tenant dataset (3 cases, task "Janet's ducks…", answer-match expect 18). HTTP-level authz/ownership/400-on-unknown is covered by server.test.ts.

Grading diversity — per-benchmark grader presets ✅

Ingestion isn't enough: each benchmark scores differently, so each adapter carries the right graders, and the case mapping is data-driven enough to express them (no per-benchmark code). Three real shapes:

• GAIA → answer-match exact: GAIA is quasi-exact-match, so the adapter sets answerMode: "exact" ({answer-match, mode: exact}) instead of the default substring contains.
• WebVoyager → judge (model-judged): official WebVoyager grades with a GPT-4V judge over the trajectory, so the adapter's preset is answer-match + steps + judge{rubric}. makeGraders(specs, { judge }) now resolves a judge spec into a JudgeGrader with an injected Judge (it stays out of the dependency-free default path — a judge spec with no injected judge throws a clear error). The judge reuses the existing modelJudge / openaiComplete transport (any OpenAI-compatible endpoint, e.g. LiteLLM).
• SWE-bench Lite → swe-bench grader + repo env: a coding benchmark, so rowToCase builds a repo env ({git, ref} from repo + base_commit), and the adapter's graderBuilder emits a swe-bench grader carrying the per-instance {testPatch, failToPass, passToPass} (since these are structured per-row, not a field mapping). SweBenchGrader implements the official resolution in the env: apply the gold test_patch (git apply), run FAIL_TO_PASS + PASS_TO_PASS (pytest), and report resolved iff all pass. (CaseMapping gained gitField/refField; BenchmarkAdapter gained graderBuilder for structured per-row graders.)

Verified live (scripts/live/judge-grading.mjs, real LiteLLM gpt-5.4-mini + real HF): WebVoyager-mini graded by the real model judge — correct trajectories pass (score 1.00 / 0.99), an intentionally-wrong one is caught (pass=false, score 0.02, reason "did not provide the required phrase… said it was unable"); GAIA preset yields answer-match{mode:exact}; SWE-bench Lite pulled from HF (astropy__astropy-12907) yields env: repo{git, ref} + a swe-bench grader carrying the real test_patch (1415 B) + FAIL_TO_PASS (2) / PASS_TO_PASS (13). So grading matches the benchmark, and a real LLM judge discriminates good vs bad runs — the scoring side of benchmark diversity.

SWE-bench resolution — real test execution ✅

SweBenchGrader runs the official resolution for real in the env (it gets a ComputeHandle from runCase): git apply the gold test_patch, run FAIL_TO_PASS + PASS_TO_PASS with pytest, resolved iff all pass. Verified live (scripts/live/swe-bench-grade.mjs, real git apply + real pytest on a self-contained instance — a calc.add bug fixed by a gold patch, test_add as FAIL_TO_PASS, test_mul as PASS_TO_PASS): with no fix the grader applies the test patch and pytest reports test_add failing (assert -1 == 5) → resolved=false; after the gold patch is applied (the agent's prediction) the same grader yields 2 passed → resolved=true. The same swe-bench grader spec is populated from a real SWE-bench_Lite row, so the grading mechanism is real and benchmark-faithful.

Benchmark-agnostic: a user onboards a new test-execution benchmark with zero first-party code ✅

SWE-bench shouldn't be special-cased — in a multi-tenant SaaS a user must bring a new benchmark (a just-released one, or their private one) without us writing code. Both halves are data, not code:

• Dependency provisioning = EvalCase.env.setup (shell install commands, run by RepoEnvironment after seeding)
  • env.image (custom base image). SWE-bench at scale = point env.image at the official prebuilt per-instance images — still data. No per-benchmark code.
• Grading = the generic CommandGrader ({cmd, cwd?, applyPatch?, passPattern?, metric?}): run a command in the env, exit-code (or output regex) → pass, with an optional grade-time git apply of a gold patch hidden from the agent. Any test-execution benchmark is one configuration of it; swe-bench (and tests-pass) are first-party presets of the same pattern.

Verified live (scripts/live/user-benchmark-selfserve.mjs, real runCase loop + real pytest): a user-defined benchmark — provided purely as an EvalCase (env.source files + env.setup deps + a command grader), with no catalog adapter and no benchmark-specific grader — runs through the full loop. With the fix → resolved=true (1 passed); without the fix → unresolved (1 failed); with the fix but env.setup removed → unresolved (ImportError — deps not provisioned), proving env.setup is the load-bearing, user-configurable dependency hook. So "bring any/new benchmark" holds for test-execution benchmarks too — the user owns the dataset, the deps, and the grading, all as data.

Per-tenant benchmark definitions — generalizing the catalog from code to data ✅

A one-off import is already tenant-scoped (the resulting Dataset is tenant-owned). The last code-coupling was the catalog itself: a reusable benchmark definition (source + mapping + grading) lived only as first-party code (BENCHMARK_CATALOG), so a tenant couldn't register/version their own. Closed by making the definition pure data: BenchmarkAdapterSpec (Zod, JSON-serializable — source, mapping, and graderTemplates with {field} interpolation, so even per-row SWE-bench-style patches become data, no graderBuilder code), importFromSpec(spec) (→ tenant-owned Dataset), and a tenant-scoped BenchmarkRegistry (@everdict/registry, InMemory; tenant + _shared fallback, version-immutable — the exact DatasetRegistry/JudgeRegistry model). So each tenant registers their own benchmark recipes in their workspace, with first-party recipes seeded into _shared.

Verified live (scripts/live/tenant-benchmark-registry.mjs, real HF for the shared one): tenant acme registers a private coding recipe (per-row test_patch → a command grader via applyPatch: "{test_patch}"), tenant globex a private QA recipe, and a first-party gsm8k recipe sits in _shared. globex cannot read acme's recipe (isolation), both see gsm8k (_shared fallback); acme imports its recipe → a tenant Dataset whose command grader has the {test_patch} interpolated into a real patch; globex imports the shared gsm8k recipe over real HF → a 2-case tenant dataset. So benchmark definitions are now per-tenant data, end-to-end — the catalog is just the _shared seed.

Recipes persisted + managed over API/web ✅

The recipe registry is now durable + first-class in the control plane: PgBenchmarkRegistry (migration 0011_create_benchmarks, same (tenant, id, version) immutable shape as datasets) wired in main.ts (Pg when DATABASE_URL, else InMemory). BenchmarkService gained registerRecipe / listRecipes / getRecipe, and import now resolves a registered recipe: {id, version} (→ importFromSpec) in addition to a catalog benchmark. HTTP: POST /benchmark-recipes (datasets:write), GET /benchmark-recipes + GET /benchmark-recipes/:id/versions/ :version (datasets:read), POST /benchmark-recipes/validate (dry-run — schema + this workspace's existing versions/conflict, no registration, mirroring /datasets/validate), and POST /benchmarks/import accepts either source. Web: a Benchmark recipes page (/dashboard/datasets/recipes) lists recipes + registers one from a JSON BenchmarkAdapterSpec (with a Validate (dry-run) button surfacing schema errors / existing versions before commit), and the Add benchmark page now offers catalog benchmarks and the workspace's own recipes in one picker. Verified at the HTTP layer by server.test.ts (register → list/get with tenant isolation [globex gets 404 on acme's recipe] → import from recipe; validate ok/conflict/schema-error without registering) and live (real API: validate of a good spec → {ok:true, source:"huggingface", versionExists:false}, a bad one → {ok:false, errors:["source: Required", "mapping: Required"]}). So a user manages reusable benchmark recipes entirely from the browser, persisted per tenant.

Verified in a real browser (chrome-devtools) ✅

The recipe/import UX was driven end-to-end in a real headless Chrome against the running web (next dev) + API (in-memory, dev fallback): the Benchmark recipes page rendered the dev-fallback principal (workspace default / admin) and a seeded recipe; Validate (dry-run) posted to the API and rendered the banner (✓ schema OK · …@1.0.0 · source= huggingface · new version); Register recipe registered it and router.refresh re-fetched so the new recipe appeared in the list; and the Add benchmark page showed the unified picker with the first-party catalog (mind2web/gsm8k/gaia/ webvoyager/swe-bench-lite) and the workspace's own recipes (the just-registered one + the seed) in one dropdown. So the browser → server-action(BFF) → control-plane round-trip works against a real browser, not just at the HTTP layer.

SWE-bench dependency provisioning — official prebuilt images as a per-case env.image seed ✅

The remaining piece for running SWE-bench at scale is per-repo dependencies — solved as data, not code, by pointing the case at the official prebuilt image (which bundles the repo at base_commit + the conda/pip env). The SWE-bench adapter seeds EvalCase.image to the official Docker Hub image via sweBenchImage(instance_id) — the verified naming swebench/sweb.eval.x86_64.<instance_id with __→_1776_>:latest — using a new data-driven CaseMapping.imageField. The backends now honor a per-case image: buildNomadJob / buildK8sJob use job.evalCase.image ?? opts.image, so a case runs in its own image instead of the default job-runner image (a general capability, not SWE-bench-specific).

Verified live (scripts/live/swe-bench-image-seed.mjs, real HF + real Docker Hub): a real SWE-bench_Lite row (astropy__astropy-12907) → case.image = swebench/sweb.eval.x86_64.astropy_1776_astropy-12907:latest, which is actually published on Docker Hub (tags: latest, v2, v1), and buildNomadJob puts that image on the container (not the default job-runner image). So dependency provisioning is now a data seed pointing at a real image.

Env-container execution — running a case inside its image (DockerDriver) ✅

The SWE-bench prebuilt image is an environment image (repo + deps, no Everdict agent). Rather than bake the agent into every multi-GB image, the case runs inside the image as a container compute and the grading executes there — the official SWE-bench shape ("the agent produces a patch; apply prediction + test_patch + run tests in the prebuilt image"). DockerDriver (@everdict/drivers) provides this: provision({image}) starts the container (docker run -d --entrypoint sleep <image> infinity) and returns a ComputeHandle whose exec/writeFile/readFile go through docker exec/stdin — so SweBenchGrader (or any grader needing compute) runs in the image, with its deps, no agent baked in.

Verified live (scripts/live/swe-bench-env-container.mjs, real Docker): a small env image (a buggy repo + pytest preinstalled, no agent — standing in for a SWE-bench prebuilt) is built, DockerDriver provisions a container from it, and SweBenchGrader runs inside via real docker exec + real pytest — with no fix → resolved=false (UNRESOLVED · F2P=1 P2P=1); after the gold patch (the agent's prediction) is applied → resolved=true (RESOLVED). The real swebench/sweb.eval.* prebuilt images run the same way (just larger). So SWE-bench is runnable end-to-end on real dependencies.

Docker container execution ✅ (registration path since folded into the capability model)

Superseded (slice 5b — ab7e2d2): docker is no longer a registerable RuntimeSpec kind (kinds are now local|nomad|k8s, and buildRuntimeBackend no longer builds a DockerBackend). "Single docker host" is now absorbed by the self-hosted runner: container execution is a docker capability the runner self-advertises, and a case.image runs in a local container via DockerDriver there. DockerDriver/DockerBackend the classes remain and drive that path. See docs/architecture/self-hosted-runtime-and-runners.md + docs/architecture/portable-harness-runtime.md. The mechanism below is unchanged — only the entry point moved (registered kind:"docker" runtime → runner docker capability).

DockerDriver runs a case's harness and grading inside a container from the case's EvalCase.image via runCaseJob(job, { driver: DockerDriver }). runCaseJob gained an optional { driver } so the same agent loop (harness + makeGradersFromEnv + RepoEnvironment) runs over any compute; DockerDriver keeps a base workdir (/everdict) so relative paths (RepoEnvironment's work) and absolute ones (SWE-bench's /testbed) both resolve.

Verified live (scripts/live/docker-runtime-backend.mjs, real Docker — historical, when kind:"docker" was still registerable): a DockerBackend's dispatch of a case (image = a git-bearing env image, a scripted harness, a command grader) runs in a container — the harness writes out.txt (snapshot.changedFiles: ["out.txt"]) and the grader verifies it inside the container (pass=true). The self-hosted runner's docker-capability path runs a per-case container image the same way; the SWE-bench prebuilt images take the exact same path.

In-image repo env-mode — SWE-bench fully autonomous ✅

The last piece: a coding agent must operate on the prebuilt image's repo (at /testbed, with deps installed), not a fresh clone. A new RepoSource variant { path } expresses "the repo is already in the image at this path." Rather than thread a work-dir through every harness/grader, RepoEnvironment.seed for {path} simply symlinks the work dir to that path (ln -sfn /testbed work), so the existing "work"-relative defaults of every harness and grader transparently operate on the in-image repo — no churn. The SWE-bench adapter now emits env.source = {path:"/testbed"} (SWE-bench's convention) + image = the prebuilt (deps), dropping the redundant clone.

Verified live (scripts/live/swe-bench-in-image.mjs, real Docker, full runCase): a prebuilt-stand-in image (/testbed = a git repo at baseline with a bug + pytest, no agent) runs the whole loop — DockerDriver provisions it, RepoEnvironment symlinks work → /testbed (no clone), a scripted agent fixes /testbed/calc.py through work (snapshot.changedFiles: ["calc.py"] — it really touched the in-image repo), and SweBenchGrader applies the gold test_patch + runs pytest in /testbed → resolved=true; the no-fix run → resolved=false. So the coding agent operates on the prebuilt repo with its real deps, end-to-end — SWE-bench is fully autonomous, with deps + repo from the image and the agent never baked in.

Validated on a real SWE-bench_Lite instance with the official image ✅

The whole pipeline was finally run on a real instance end-to-end (scripts/live/swe-bench-real-instance.mjs): psf__requests-3362 pulled the official multi-GB image swebench/sweb.eval.x86_64.psf_1776_requests-3362:latest (the repo at base_commit + the real conda deps), DockerDriver provisioned it (auto-detecting the testbed conda env), and SweBenchGrader applied the dataset's gold test_patch and ran the real FAIL_TO_PASS test under real pytest: with the dataset's gold patch applied (standing in for the agent's prediction) → resolved=true; without it → resolved=false. (PASS_TO_PASS was skipped here only because the offline sandbox can't reach the network some of requests' regression tests need; FAIL_TO_PASS is the bug-fix signal.) The image was removed + the build cache pruned afterward (disk returned to its prior level). So the SWE-bench evaluation path is verified against a real published image with real dependencies — not just stand-ins.

Prompt env kind — non-browser QA as a first-class environment ✅

Pure-QA benchmarks (GSM8K, GAIA) have no stage — the agent just answers a prompt. They were mapped to a browser-less browser env as a stopgap; now there's a proper prompt env kind (EnvSpec + EnvSnapshot variants alongside repo/browser). PromptEnvironment is a no-stage environment (seed is a no-op, snapshot returns {kind:"prompt"}); grading reads the answer from the trace (answer-match/judge). runCaseJob now selects the environment by evalCase.env.kind (prompt → PromptEnvironment, else RepoEnvironment), and the CaseMapping.promptEnv flag makes the gsm8k/gaia adapters emit env: {kind:"prompt"} instead of the browser-less stopgap.

Verified live (scripts/live/prompt-env-qa.mjs): the gsm8k adapter emits case.env = {kind:"prompt"}; runCaseJob on a prompt case yields snapshot.kind === "prompt" (proving PromptEnvironment is selected — a repo env would have thrown at seed); and runCase(PromptEnvironment + a QA harness + answer-match) grades the answer (pass=true) with no browser/repo stage. So non-browser QA is a first-class environment, not a workaround.

os-use env kind — desktop (computer-use) as a first-class environment ✅

Desktop-automation benchmarks (OSWorld, and apps like hermes-desktop) need an agent to see a screen and drive GUI apps. Added an os-use env kind (EnvSpec {kind:"os-use", display?, setup?, screenshotCmd?, screenshotPath?}

• EnvSnapshot {kind:"os-use", screenshotRef, windows}) and an OsUseEnvironment that runs inside a desktop compute image (Xvfb + the app): seed runs the setup commands (start Xvfb / window manager / the desktop app, with DISPLAY injected), snapshot captures a screenshot (scrot) + the window list (wmctrl). runCaseJob selects it by env.kind (os-use → OsUseEnvironment); pairs with the DockerDriver env-container so the desktop image is the case compute (same model as SWE-bench prebuilt). VLM judge over the screenshot is the natural grader.

Verified live (scripts/live/os-use-desktop.mjs, real Docker + Xvfb): a desktop image (Xvfb + scrot + xclock) runs through runCase — OsUseEnvironment brings up the display + app and captures a real screenshot (snapshot.kind="os-use", a non-empty 13 KB PNG), graded inside the container.

Real hermes-desktop experiment: the actual hermes-desktop Electron app was built into a desktop image (npm install + electron-vite build + the Electron binary + Chromium runtime libs) and launched headless under Xvfb (electron … --no-sandbox); OsUseEnvironment's screenshot captured its real first-run UI ("Welcome to Hermes One" — Get Started / Connect via SSH), a 44 KB rendered PNG (vs the 13 KB blank root). So os-use observes a real third-party desktop app end-to-end. (The multi-GB image was removed + build cache pruned afterward; disk returned to its prior level.)

hermes-desktop actually driven — the computer-use loop, not just boot+render (scripts/live/os-use-hermes-drive.mjs): SLICE 72 proved hermes boots, renders, and is observable. This proves the missing piece — an agent acts on it and the app responds, observed by os-use. The os-use env launches hermes with ENABLE_CDP=1 (its main process opens a remote-debugging port); the "agent" attaches over CDP (via hermes' own bundled playwright, attach-only — no browser download) only to locate the Connect to Remote Hermes button (boundingBox() + the X window's screen offset + devicePixelRatio), then injects a real OS mouse click with xdotool into Xvfb at those screen coordinates — a genuine computer-use action, not a synthetic DOM .click(). The app transitions Welcome → the Remote-connect form; this is verified two independent ways: (a) playwright DOM truth — before: Server URL not present, 0 inputs → after: Server URL visible, 2 inputs (URL + API key); (b) os-use scrot before/after screenshots that visibly differ (Welcome screen → connect form, with the cursor parked on the Server URL field where the click landed). Grader gui-drive asserts ready && clicked && transitioned → pass=true (inputs 0->2, dpr=1, click at (640,635)). So an agent can perceive → locate → inject real OS input → cause a real state change → observe it on a real third-party desktop app — the loop a desktop-task benchmark needs. (Full task completion, e.g. SSH-connect-and-run, needs a target SSH server + credentials and is the next rung; this rung proves the drive+observe mechanism.)

VLM judge over the os-use screenshot — auto-grading desktop tasks ✅

A desktop/computer-use task has no pass/fail test command — the goal is a visual state ("the remote-connect form is open", "the file is saved", "the chart rendered"). So the natural grader is a VLM that looks at the screenshot and judges the goal state — with no benchmark-specific code (the tenant defines the goal as a task + rubric, data not code). The existing Judge/JudgeGrader/modelJudge abstraction already had a screenshot slot but only wired it for browser snapshots and a text-only transport. SLICE 74 makes it real for os-use:

• JudgeImage {base64, mediaType} added to the Judge input; JudgeGrader (when useScreenshot) resolves an os-use snapshot's screenshotRef to bytes by running base64 in the case compute (the screenshot lives inside the desktop env-container) and passes the image through.
• JudgeCompletion gains an optional image arg; openaiComplete attaches an OpenAI-compatible image_url data-URL block and anthropicComplete an Anthropic image block — so the same judge works over a LiteLLM proxy or Anthropic directly. All backward-compatible (image optional; trace/DOM judging unchanged). +5 deterministic tests (transport image blocks, modelJudge passthrough, grader os-use resolution, useScreenshot:false reads nothing). Repo typecheck 33/33, test 33/33.

Verified live (scripts/live/os-use-vlm-judge.mjs, real VLM via the LiteLLM proxy, gpt-5.4-mini): the real production path (judgeFromEnv → modelJudge → openaiComplete(image_url) → JudgeGrader.resolveScreenshot) graded the two real hermes os-use screenshots from the drive run, judging purely from pixels against the rubric "PASS only if a Server URL input is visible; the welcome landing screen is NOT the goal" — after (Connect-to-Remote form) → pass=true score=1 ("the 'Connect to Remote Hermes' screen with a visible 'Server URL' input field… matches the goal state"); before (Welcome landing) → pass=false score=0.11 ("the initial welcome screen… no visible Server URL field. This is not the goal state"). So a tenant can score an arbitrary desktop/UI task by describing the goal in words — the loop SLICE 73 proved (perceive→act→observe) now closes with observe→judge, end-to-end auto-grading with no per-benchmark grader.

Full desktop task end-to-end — hermes connects over a real SSH tunnel, auto-graded ✅

The prior rungs proved drive (SLICE 73) and judge (SLICE 74) on a UI panel transition. This proves a real, multi-step desktop task completing for real, not just a panel swap (scripts/live/os-use-hermes-ssh-task.mjs). Task: "connect Hermes to a remote machine over SSH." Topology (all real, inside one os-use env-container): an sshd (host keys + ed25519 key auth) and a /health 200 stub on the remote Hermes port (:8642); hermes connects to 127.0.0.1 — a genuine SSH tunnel over loopback. The agent fills the SSH form (Host/Username/Key path) with a real OS keyboard (xdotool type) and clicks Connect via SSH; hermes' testSshConnection spawns the system ssh client (ssh -N -L <free>:127.0.0.1:8642 -i /root/.ssh/id_rsa root@127.0.0.1), opens the port-forward, polls /health through it, and only on 200 advances (setSshConfig → onRecheck → splash "Starting SSH tunnel…" → main).

Double proof. (a) Deterministic ground truth: hermes left the form (afterHostVisible=false, no sshError) and the real tunnel process is alive — captured verbatim: ssh -N -L 18642:127.0.0.1:8642 -p 22 -i /root/.ssh/id_rsa … root@127.0.0.1. hermes advances only if the tunnel + health truly succeeded, so reaching the main app is itself evidence real SSH bytes flowed. (b) VLM judge (the SLICE 74 production path, over the docker compute): the post-connect screenshot → pass=true score=0.99 ("Hermes already past the SSH connection form and into the main app screen, with no connection-error message"); the filled-but-not-yet-connected SSH form → pass=false score=0.02. The captured screenshots confirm it visually: the SSH form (Host 127.0.0.1, Username root, key /root/.ssh/id_rsa) → the full Hermes One app (Chat / Discover / Office / Kanban sidebar, "Ask anything" composer) loaded over the tunnel. So a real desktop task executes end-to-end and is auto-graded — the complete loop a computer-use benchmark runs: provision env → drive with real OS input → the app does real work → observe → VLM judge. (Loopback SSH keeps it self-contained; a remote host is the same flow with a different host. The multi-GB image + build cache were removed afterward; disk returned to prior level.)

os-use full loop as one dispatch — runCaseJob(CaseJob), not a hand-written script ✅

SLICES 73/75 wired the driver + grading by hand in a live script. This makes the whole os-use desktop task a single CaseJob the control plane dispatches — runCaseJob(job) runs it end-to-end (provision → seed → agent drives → snapshot → VLM judge → CaseResult), no bespoke orchestration. The job is pure data:

• harnessSpec: a command harness node /agent.cjs {{task}} with env:{DISPLAY:":99"} — the declarative-CLI-agent abstraction now doubles as the desktop agent. The agent under test is just a program in the env; here a baked reference agent (examples/agents/desktop-ssh-agent.cjs) drives via CDP-locate + xdotool real OS input (BYO agents drop in their own program / image).
• evalCase.env: os-use with setup = sshd + /health stub + Xvfb + hermes; runCaseJob already selects OsUseEnvironment by env.kind.
• evalCase.graders: [{ id:"judge", config:{ useScreenshot:true, rubric } }]; with job.judge (model/provider) + secret env, makeGradersFromEnv builds the VLM JudgeGrader over the os-use snapshot (SLICE 74 path).

Enabling core change: CommandHarnessSpec gained an optional workDir — the command harness ran in "work" (→ /everdict/work), which os-use containers don't create, so a desktop command-agent couldn't even chdir. With workDir:"/tmp" (an existing dir) the agent runs. CommandHarness now uses spec.workDir ?? opts.workDir ?? "work" for both setup and the command (+2 tests; default stays "work").

Verified live (scripts/live/os-use-dispatch.mjs, real Docker + real VLM): one runCaseJob(job) → snapshot.kind="os-use", scores=[{ graderId:"judge", pass:true, value:0.98 }] — the VLM read the final screen as "past the SSH connection form and into the main app UI, sidebar (Chat, Discover…) and the 'Ask anything' box visible, no SSH error." So the full computer-use loop — provision desktop → drive with real OS input → app does real work (opens a genuine SSH tunnel) → observe → VLM judge — is now a one-call control-plane dispatch, not a live script. (Image build is a documented pre-step in scripts/live/Dockerfile.hermes-ssh-agent; removed afterward, disk returned to prior level.)

os-use benchmark over the HTTP API — POST /runs, registered as data ✅

SLICE 76 dispatched via runCaseJob in a node script. This registers the whole os-use task as first-party catalog data and dispatches it through the real HTTP control plane — what a SaaS tenant actually calls:

• examples/datasets/hermes-desktop-ssh.json — a Dataset whose single EvalCase is the os-use SSH task (env os-use + setup, graders:[judge useScreenshot], placement.target:"docker"); seeded to _shared, served at GET /datasets.
• examples/harness-templates/desktop-ssh-agent.instance.json — the command desktop agent (workDir:"/tmp"); served at GET /harnesses.
• Execution runtime — the os-use case's image runs in a local container. When this section first shipped, a registerable docker RuntimeSpec (examples/runtimes/docker-1.0.0.json) resolved placement.target:"docker" → buildRuntimeBackend → DockerBackend → runCaseJob(DockerDriver). Since slice 5b (ab7e2d2) docker is no longer a registerable runtime kind (kinds are local|nomad|k8s) and that example file was removed (038c31d); container execution is now the self-hosted runner's docker capability (a local DockerDriver), or a nomad/k8s runtime honoring EvalCase.image. Either way there's no new dispatch code: the existing control-plane path (RunService.submit → RuntimeDispatcher → Scheduler → backend) already carries an os-use job.
• Seed-guard tests (harness-seed.test.ts, +3) assert all three catalogs parse with their schemas and land in _shared.

Verified live against the running API server (apps/api on a port, InMemory store, dev-tenant header): GET /datasets lists hermes-desktop-ssh, GET /harnesses lists desktop-ssh-agent; then POST /runs with {harness, case, judge} → 202 {id, status:"queued"}; polling GET /runs/:id → status:"succeeded" in ~27 s with result.snapshot.kind="os-use" and scores:[{ graderId:"judge", pass:true, value:0.99 }] ("Hermes main app screen, sidebar Chat/Discover, 'Ask anything' box, advanced past the SSH form, no error"). Since the agent program (/agent.cjs) exists only baked in the desktop image, a real main-app screenshot proves it ran in the docker env-container (a local host fallback has neither the agent nor Xvfb). So a tenant runs the full desktop computer-use benchmark by picking a registered dataset + harness and POSTing one run — no bespoke code, no live orchestration script. (Desktop image built from Dockerfile.hermes-ssh-agent; removed afterward, disk returned to prior level.)

os-use scorecard — POST /scorecards, multi-case batch + aggregate ✅

A single run grades one case; a scorecard runs a dataset's cases × a harness and aggregates — the unit that lets you compare harnesses fairly and measure which capabilities an agent has. The batch path already existed (ScorecardService.submit → runSuite(cases × harness, dispatch, {concurrency}) → applyJudges → summarizeScorecard, with per-case placement.target routing and RunScorecardBodySchema carrying runtime/judge like POST /runs), so os-use needed no new code — only a genuinely multi-case dataset. hermes-desktop-ssh now has two os-use cases that probe different capabilities of the same desktop image: hermes-ssh-connect (open a real SSH tunnel → reach the main app) and hermes-open-settings (navigate to the Settings page after connecting). The scripted reference agent only does the SSH flow, so the scorecard should split.

Verified live (POST /scorecards { dataset, harness, judge } against the running API): 202 queued → GET /scorecards/:id → succeeded with two per-case rows judged by the VLM and an aggregate — hermes-ssh-connect → pass=true 0.98 ("main app, advanced past the SSH form"); hermes-open-settings → pass=false 0.03 ("Chat screen with a modal, not the Settings page; a Settings link in the sidebar alone isn't sufficient"); summary { metric:"judge", count:2, mean:0.505, passRate:0.5 }. The fail is honest signal, not a bug: the reference agent connects but doesn't navigate, so the scorecard records passRate:0.5 — exactly the capability gap a better agent would close, and the comparison axis diffScorecards/GET /scorecards/:a/diff/:b reports across harness versions. So desktop computer-use is now a first-class benchmark (multi-case dataset → batch scorecard → aggregate + diff), reached over the same HTTP control plane. (Seed-guard test asserts the multi-case dataset parses to _shared; image removed afterward.)

OSWorld imported as os-use cases — the desktop benchmark ecosystem ✅

The hand-authored hermes-desktop-ssh dataset proves the runtime; this connects the ecosystem — OSWorld (xlang-ai/OSWorld, real OS/app computer-use tasks) imported into everdict's os-use runtime via the same data-driven BenchmarkAdapter path that already carries GSM8K/GAIA/SWE-bench/WebVoyager. "New benchmark = one adapter, not code."

• CaseMapping (+ rowToCase) gained an os-use branch plus constant image/placement (data-driven, so it's JSON-serializable for tenant BenchmarkAdapterSpec too): osUseEnv → {kind:"os-use", display, setup, screenshotPath}, placement:"docker" on every case, a shared desktop image. (The literal "docker" target predates slice 5b, when docker was a registerable runtime kind; container execution is now the self-hosted runner's docker capability or a nomad/k8s runtime honoring the case image — the adapter still emits the legacy string.)
• The osworld catalog adapter maps id/instruction → an os-use case; grading is a per-row VLM judge (graderBuilder interpolates each task's instruction into the rubric — "PASS only if the final desktop screenshot shows this task completed: …"). OSWorld's upstream per-task Python evaluators don't port across runtimes, so the screenshot judge is the harness-agnostic grader (same adaptation GSM8K/GAIA make: map to everdict's env + grader, not the upstream harness). Source is jsonl (OSWorld ships task JSON; a tenant uploads it); the desktop image with the apps is the tenant's to build (the SWE-bench-prebuilt pattern). New category: "desktop".

Verified live over the HTTP API (jsonl import is pure — no container): GET /benchmarks lists { id:"osworld", category:"desktop" }; POST /benchmarks/import { benchmark:"osworld", text:<OSWorld jsonl> } → 201, and GET /datasets/osworld-mini/versions/1.0.0 → os-use EvalCases — placement.target:"docker", image:"everdict-osworld:demo", snapshot/source tags, and a judge useScreenshot grader whose rubric carries that row's instruction. These are the same os-use case shape SLICES 76–78 proved runnable (runCaseJob/POST /runs/scorecards), so once a tenant supplies an OSWorld desktop image + a computer-use agent, OSWorld runs and scores through the existing control plane. (Deterministic adapter tests cover the mapping + per-row rubric; no docker this slice.)

Web UI — trigger os-use scorecards + read the VLM verdict per case ✅

The dashboard could already trigger/list scorecards, but the result view only showed score badges (metric value) — the judge verdict (score.detail, the VLM's reasoning) and the os-use snapshot were dropped, which is most of the signal for a screenshot-judged desktop benchmark. SLICE 80 surfaces them and makes os-use self-serve from the browser (apps/web, prettier+eslint, FSD):

• Result view (scorecards/[id], runs/[id]): the scorecard entity schema now types score.detail + the case snapshot (already arriving via passthrough); each case renders an os-use snapshot badge and the per-grader verdict text (the VLM's pass/fail reasoning), alongside the existing aggregate StatCards (pass-rate).
• Trigger (run-scorecard feature): an optional inline judge-model field (e.g. gpt-5.4-mini) → the scorecard body's judge override, so a tenant runs a VLM-judged os-use scorecard from the form without first setting a workspace-default judge. The dataset/harness datalists already list the registered hermes-desktop-ssh + desktop-ssh-agent.

Verified live (Next.js dev server against the running API, Keycloak disabled for dev so the dashboard route is reachable; scorecard seeded via POST /scorecards/ingest, no docker): the server-rendered scorecards/:id HTML contains both case rows, the os-use badge, the VLM verdicts ("…the Hermes main app screen…", "…NOT the Settings page. Not the goal."), the per-case scores (0.98/0.03), and the aggregate pass 50%; the scorecards/new form renders the judge-model field and lists hermes-desktop-ssh + desktop-ssh-agent. Web typechecks (tsc) + eslint clean. (Screenshot bytes aren't persisted yet — the os-use snapshot carries a container path, so the view shows the VLM verdict text; persisting screenshots to object storage to show them inline is the next rung.)

os-use screenshot persisted + shown inline — the actual screen, end-to-end ✅

The previous rung showed the VLM verdict text because the os-use snapshot only carried a container path (gone after dispose). This carries the screenshot bytes out so the result view shows the real image. The snapshot is the only thing that survives the disposed compute, so it becomes the transport: OsUseSnapshot gains a screenshot field, and OsUseEnvironment.snapshot reads the captured PNG via base64 (best-effort) into it — alongside the existing screenshotRef/windows. Two payoffs:

• the VLM judge now prefers the embedded base64 (JudgeGrader.resolveScreenshot) — no extra compute.exec, and it works for result-time grading after the container is gone (the live-run path still falls back to reading the file);
• the web result views render it: the run + scorecard entity snapshot schemas type screenshot, and runs/[id] / scorecards/[id] show an inline <img src="data:image/png;base64,…"> (the run page's JSON dump substitutes <base64> so it isn't duplicated). +2 grader tests (embedded path used without compute; capture asserted).

Verified live, full loop (real Docker + real VLM + real web): POST /runs of the hermes-ssh-connect os-use case → succeeded with snapshot.screenshot a 90 KB base64 (a 67 KB PNG); decoded, it's the real Hermes main-app screen (sidebar Chat/Discover, "Ask anything"), and the judge scored 0.98 using that embedded image. The web runs/:id page (server-rendered against the API) emits … — the actual screenshot inline — next to the judge verdict and os-use kind. So a tenant sees, per case, the exact screen the agent left and the model judged. (Dev posture: the base64 rides in the result record, matching the InMemory-store dev path; production offloads to object storage with a presigned URL in screenshotRef — same field, swappable. Image removed afterward; disk to prior level.)

Object-storage offload — screenshot to MinIO, presigned URL in a slim record ✅

SLICE 81's base64-in-the-record is the dev posture; this is the production swap promised there. New @everdict/storage: an ArtifactStore interface (put(key, bytes, contentType) → ref + get(key) → bytes, the durable read-back handle — the ref is presigned and expires), an S3ArtifactStore (MinIO/S3 via the AWS SDK — PutObject + a presigned GetObject URL, path-style, presigned FOR publicBaseUrl when set (SigV4 signs the host, so the URL can't be rewritten after signing) + ensureBucket), an InMemoryArtifactStore for tests, and offloadSnapshot(snapshot, store, key) — for an os-use snapshot it uploads the embedded base64, sets screenshotRef to the returned URL, and clears screenshot so the record stays small. The control plane wires it: RunService/ScorecardService take an optional artifacts store and offload each os-use snapshot after dispatch (best-effort — a storage failure keeps the base64 fallback, the run still succeeds); main.ts builds the store from env (EVERDICT_S3_ENDPOINT/BUCKET/ACCESS_KEY/SECRET_KEY, optional region/public URL) or leaves it unset (→ base64 dev fallback). The web osUseShotSrc helper renders the URL when screenshotRef is http(s), else the base64 data URL — same <img>, either source. +4 storage tests.

Verified live against the running infra-minio (docker-free via ingest): with the API configured for MinIO, POST /scorecards/ingest of an os-use case carrying a base64 screenshot → the stored record's snapshot has no base64 (screenshot empty) and screenshotRef is a MinIO presigned URL (http://localhost:9100/everdict-artifacts/scorecards/<id>/<case>.png?X-Amz-…); the record is ~1.4 KB (was ~90 KB inline). curl-ing that URL returns the actual object — HTTP 200, content-type: image/png, file confirms a PNG — so the bytes really live in object storage. The web scorecards/:id page server-renders <img src="http://…/everdict-artifacts/… ?X-Amz-…"> (page slim, no inline base64) — the browser fetches the image straight from MinIO. So the result record is a small pointer and the screenshot lives in object storage with a presigned URL: the production-correct shape, and a one-line config swap from the dev base64 path.

Harness A/B on os-use — a second desktop agent, scored by diffScorecards ✅

A scorecard's reason for existing is fair harness comparison — and that needs two harnesses. This adds a second, more-capable reference desktop agent and shows the diff. desktop-ssh-agent (agent #1) only connects via SSH; desktop-ssh-settings-agent (agent #2, examples/agents/desktop-ssh-settings-agent.cjs) is task-aware — it connects, then if the task asks for Settings it dismisses the modal and navigates to the Settings page (real OS clicks). Both are baked into the desktop image (/agent.cjs, /agent-settings.cjs); each is a command HarnessSpec. No diff code was needed — diffScorecards / GET /scorecards/diff already existed; this is the second agent that makes it meaningful.

Verified live, full A/B (real Docker + real VLM, both scorecards over hermes-desktop-ssh via POST /scorecards):

• agent #1 → judge passRate 0.5: hermes-ssh-connect pass 0.98, hermes-open-settings fail 0.03 (never navigates);
• agent #2 → judge passRate 1.0: hermes-ssh-connect pass 0.98, hermes-open-settings pass 1.0 (reaches Settings);
• GET /scorecards/diff?baseline=<#1>&candidate=<#2> → judge mean 0.505 → 0.99 (Δ +0.485), improvements (fixed): hermes-open-settings/judge 0.03→1, regressions: none.

So two real computer-use agents are scored on the same desktop benchmark and the platform reports, per case, exactly which capability the better agent gained (Settings navigation) with no regressions — the fair-comparison payoff of the whole pipeline, end-to-end over the HTTP control plane. (Image with both agents removed afterward; disk to prior level.)

Service-topology backend wired into control-plane dispatch ✅

Phase 1 of this design (contracts, Nomad and K8s topology builders, EnvironmentManager, trace mappers, and ServiceTopologyBackend over a mock TopologyRuntime → CaseResult) is built and unit-tested in @everdict/topology / @everdict/trace (57 + trace tests). The one deferred piece was the wire-in: making a service harness (e.g. bu, browser-use) reachable from POST /runs like the other backends. Done:

• core: a topology RuntimeSpec kind (orchestrator: nomad|k8s + cluster connection + a traceSource for the OTel/MLflow pull; cluster tokens stay authSecret names, not values).
• @everdict/backends can't construct ServiceTopologyBackend (it would cycle — @everdict/topology depends on backends for the Backend interface), so buildRuntimeBackend now explicitly throws for topology, and the wiring lives in apps/api buildTopologyBackend (depends on both): it builds a NomadTopologyRuntime/K8sTopologyRuntime + buildTraceSource + a ServiceTopologyBackend whose specFor resolves the service harness from the registry (rejects non-service harnesses). RuntimeDispatcher gained an injectable buildBackend (default buildRuntimeBackend); the app passes one that routes topology runtimes to buildTopologyBackend and everything else to buildRuntimeBackend. So a tenant registers a topology runtime, points a service harness's case placement.target at it, and the same Scheduler/fairness/budget path runs it — identical routing to nomad/k8s.

Verified deterministically (+4 tests, no cluster — the live deploy/drive/trace-pull is Phase 2, needing the tenant's Nomad/K8s + the browser-use images, exactly as the nomad/k8s backends are also not run here): RuntimeSpecSchema accepts a topology runtime (so POST /runtimes validates it); buildTopologyBackend yields a backend id service:nomad / service:k8s; and dispatching a non-service harness through it fails fast with BAD_REQUEST from specFor before any cluster call. So the service-topology track is now dispatchable through the product API, not just a library.

OSWorld actually run — a real GUI app task, end-to-end ✅

SLICE 79 imported OSWorld tasks; this runs one for real on a real desktop app. A lightweight OSWorld desktop image (scripts/live/Dockerfile.osworld → everdict-osworld:demo, 565 MB: Debian + Xvfb + openbox WM + xdotool/scrot + mousepad text editor + nodejs + the agent) — the image name matches the osworld adapter's default image, so an imported task lands on it. The osworld adapter's osUseSetup now brings up Xvfb + openbox so launched apps get focus. A reference agent (examples/agents/desktop-osworld-agent.cjs, a command harness) opens the editor and types the instruction's quoted text via real OS keyboard (xdotool); the VLM judge grades the screenshot against the per-row rubric.

Verified live, full chain (real Docker + real VLM): POST /benchmarks/import { benchmark:"osworld", text:<task jsonl> } (task Type 'Hello from OSWorld' into the text editor.) → registered os-use dataset; POST /runs with the desktop-osworld-agent harness → RuntimeDispatcher → the container runtime (ran at the time via the then-registerable docker runtime → DockerBackend; that entry point is now the self-hosted runner's docker capability — slice 5b) → os-use env (Xvfb+openbox) → the agent launches Mousepad and types the text → OsUseEnvironment snapshot → VLM judge pass 1.0 ("the text editor visibly contains the exact text 'Hello from OSWorld'"). The decoded screenshot shows a real Mousepad window with the typed text. So an OSWorld-category task runs on a real GUI application and is auto-graded — import → dispatch → drive (real OS input) → observe → judge — entirely through the product API. (Image removed afterward; judge key from env, never committed.)

OSWorld multi-step task + state-based grading — the evaluator pattern ✅

The first OSWorld run was single-step (open + type). This adds a multi-step GUI task and, more importantly, state-based grading — OSWorld's real evaluators check system state, not pixels. The osworld adapter's graderBuilder now maps a row's optional verify (a shell command — the portable stand-in for OSWorld's Python evaluator) to a command grader (exit code = pass, cwd:/tmp) alongside the VLM judge, so a task is graded by real file/system state and the screenshot. The reference agent gained a save flow: type the content, then if the instruction names a file it does Ctrl+S → the GTK save dialog → types the absolute path → Enter (real multi-step OS input).

Verified live, dual-graded (real Docker + real VLM): task Create a text file note.txt in the home directory containing 'OSWorld save test' (with verify: test -f /root/note.txt && grep -q 'OSWorld save test' /root/note.txt) → imported → POST /runs → the agent typed the text and drove the Save-As dialog. Result:

• command/state grader → pass 1.0 — the file genuinely exists on disk with the right content (the authoritative, OSWorld-style check);
• VLM judge → 0.92 but pass:false — it correctly read the screen ("Mousepad editing /root/note.txt with the text OSWorld save test") but was strict that an on-disk save isn't fully confirmable from pixels.

The decoded screenshot shows the title bar /root/note.txt - Mousepad (no unsaved-*) with the text — the multi-step save worked. This is exactly why OSWorld grades on state: the state grader is decisive (task done), the VLM is a complementary signal, and everdict runs both over the same os-use result. (Image removed afterward; key from env.)

OSWorld multi-task scorecard — batch + per-metric aggregate ✅

One OSWorld task is a run; a suite is a scorecard. examples/benchmarks/osworld-sample.jsonl is a committed 3-task OSWorld suite (two text-file saves + one folder-create), each with a verify state check. Imported via the osworld adapter it becomes a 3-case os-use dataset (each case = VLM judge + state command grader); a guard test asserts that mapping. Running it as a scorecard exercises the batch path (runSuite) over real desktop tasks and aggregates per metric.

Verified live (POST /benchmarks/import the suite → POST /scorecards with desktop-osworld-agent, real Docker + real VLM): three os-use cases ran (parallel), each driven + dual-graded —

• writer-note state PASS (file on disk), writer-todo state PASS, files-folder state fail (the text-editor agent doesn't create folders);
• aggregate state passRate 0.667 (2/3) — the authoritative, OSWorld-style number: the agent completes two of the three tasks; judge passRate 0 (the VLM stays cautious on disk-save and clearly fails the folder), shown alongside as the complementary signal.

So a multi-task OSWorld suite runs as a single scorecard with a per-case + aggregate report, and the state metric gives the honest capability score (2/3) while exposing exactly which task the agent can't do yet (folder-create) — the same gap a more capable agent would close (cf. the harness-A/B diff). repo lint, typecheck 35/35, test 35/35 (+1 guard). (Image removed afterward; judge key from env, never committed.)

Service-topology Phase 2 — K8sTopologyRuntime run on a real cluster (kind) ✅

The topology builders/runtimes were only ever unit-tested with a mock kubectl. This runs K8sTopologyRuntime against a real Kubernetes cluster (a local kind), the core Phase-2 claim ("apply against a real K8s cluster"). A minimal service-topology harness (one stub front-door service everdict-topo-stub:demo — scripts/live/topology-stub/, kind-loaded; a browser target; no stores) drives the real orchestration path.

Verified live (scripts/live/topology-k8s.mjs, context kind-everdict): ensureTopology(spec) → kubectl apply of the generated Deployment+Service into namespace everdict-default → rolloutStatus waited for the real pod (topo-demo-agent ready 1/1, confirmed by kubectl get deploy) → kubectl port-forward discovered the endpoint (http://127.0.0.1:<port>). Then the per-run front-door drive: GET /health → 200, POST /runs with the {task, thread_id, stream_channel} wiring → 200. teardown(spec) stopped the forwards and deleted the namespace (clean, exit 0). So the orchestrator-agnostic runtime genuinely deploys a warm topology, discovers it, and drives it on a real cluster — not a mock.

Per-case browser, also live (same script, extended): after the warm topology + drive, provisionBrowserEnv(spec, runId) launched a real headless Chromium pod (chromedp/headless-shell, kind-loaded → everdict-browser-<runId> Deployment alongside the warm topo-demo-agent), port-forwarded :9222, and connectBrowser got a real CDP webSocketDebuggerUrl (ws://127.0.0.1:<port>/devtools/browser/…). browser.snapshot() hit CDP /json/list → a real browser snapshot (url:"about:blank", dom = the live target list); browser.dispose() removed the per-case browser (warm topology kept), then teardown cleaned the namespace. So the full per-case path — warm services → per-case real-browser CDP → snapshot → cleanup — runs on a real cluster. The only piece left is the agent-server actually driving the browser via the extension (the harness under test) + its OTel/MLflow trace pull, which need the real browser-use images (the unit-tested provisionBrowserEnv/builders already target them). (Stub + browser images stay in the kind node's containerd; host stub image removed; namespace deleted.)

Trace pull verified against a real backend — OTel/Jaeger ✅

The trace mappers (OtelTraceSource/MlflowTraceSource → TraceEvent[], used by scorecard pull-ingest POST /scorecards/ingest/pull and the command harness's trace extraction) were only mock-fetch unit-tested. This runs OtelTraceSource against a real Jaeger (everdict-jaeger: OTLP-in :4318, query :16686).

Verified live (scripts/live/trace-otel.mjs): a real OTLP span (OTel GenAI conventions — gen_ai.request.model=gpt-5.4-mini, gen_ai.usage.input_tokens=100, output_tokens=42, cost=0.0012) was POSTed to Jaeger's OTLP endpoint; then OtelTraceSource({endpoint: "http://…:16686"}).fetch(traceId) pulled it via Jaeger's query API (/api/traces/{id}) and normalized it to [{ kind:"llm_call", model:"gpt-5.4-mini", cost:{ inputTokens:100, outputTokens:42, usd:0.0012 }, latencyMs:1500 }]. So the pull path (emit → ingest → fetch → normalize) works against a real tracing backend, not a mock — the same path that grades a black-box harness's trace, with cost/tokens flowing into the cost/budget graders.

MLflow too, symmetric (scripts/live/trace-mlflow.mjs, real infra-mlflow 3.10 with Basic auth): a trace is logged via the mlflow Python SDK (a chat span carrying mlflow.llm.model, mlflow.chat.tokenUsage, mlflow.llm.cost), then MlflowTraceSource({endpoint, headers:{authorization:"Basic …"}}).fetch(trace_id) pulls it from MLflow 3.x's trace REST (GET /api/3.0/mlflow/traces/get?trace_id=) and normalizes the same way → [{ kind:"llm_call", model:"gpt-5.4-mini", cost:{ inputTokens:100, outputTokens:42, usd:0.0012 }, latencyMs:… }]. This confirmed the MLflow-specific decode against the real server: attributes arrive as OTLP keyvalues with kvlist_value (tokenUsage/cost structured, model a string_value), which parseMlflowTrace + the mlflow.* fallbacks in spansToTraceEvents handle. So both trace backends (OTel/Jaeger and MLflow 3.x) pull live into the same normalized TraceEvent[]. (Credentials read from infra/.env at runtime, never committed.)

Service-topology Phase 2 on Nomad too — NomadTopologyRuntime live, orchestrator-agnostic confirmed ✅

The K8s runtime was proven live (SLICE 88/89); this proves the same orchestrator-agnostic ServiceTopologyBackend runtime on Nomad — the whole point of the TopologyRuntime interface. A local nomad agent -dev (docker driver, Healthy) ran the same minimal topology.

Verified live (scripts/live/topology-nomad.mjs, addr=http://localhost:4646): ensureTopology(spec) registered the generated Nomad job, waitForGroupRunning waited for the alloc, and resolvePort discovered the dynamic host port (http://127.0.0.1:20985); the per-run front-door drive hit GET /health → 200, POST /runs → 200. Then provisionBrowserEnv(spec, runId) ran a per-case real headless Chromium (Nomad dispatch alloc) and connectBrowser got a real CDP webSocketDebuggerUrl (ws://127.0.0.1:21481/devtools/browser/…); browser.snapshot() → a browser snapshot (about:blank); teardown(spec) deregistered the jobs (clean, exit 0). So the identical deploy → discover → drive → per-case-browser → teardown path runs on both Nomad and K8s — the orchestrator-agnostic claim, live on both. (Only the agent-server actually driving the browser via the extension remains, needing the real browser-use images. Nomad dev agent stopped + stub image removed afterward.)

First-party harness catalog seeded into _shared ✅

The harness registry mirrors the dataset/judge/runtime model (tenant + _shared fallback, version-immutable), and tenants register any CLI agent declaratively as a command HarnessSpec (setup + a {{task}}/{{model}}/ {{run_id}} command + trace none/otel/mlflow) — no code adapter. But the first-party presets in examples/harness-templates (aider, aider-litellm, the bu service topology) were not seeded at startup (unlike datasets/judges/runtimes), so they weren't available to tenants out of the box. main.ts now calls seedSharedHarnesses (loadHarnessDir from EVERDICT_HARNESSES_DIR, default examples/harness-templates) alongside the other seeders, so first-party harnesses load into _shared and every tenant can evaluate with them immediately (or register their own, which coexist).

Verified live (real API): startup logs ▶ shared harnesses seeded from …/examples/harness-templates, and GET /harnesses for a fresh tenant returns aider(_shared), aider-litellm(_shared), bu(_shared); after the tenant registers my-agent, the list is [aider(_shared), aider-litellm(_shared), bu(_shared), my-agent(acme)] — first-party + tenant harnesses side by side. A guard test (harness-seed.test.ts) parses every examples/harness-templates/*.json against HarnessSpecSchema (both command and service kinds) so a malformed preset can't regress the catalog. (Adding a new first-party agent is now just dropping a command spec JSON in the dir.)

Judge threaded through the normal dispatch path ✅

A judge grader preset (e.g. WebVoyager) must run in a normal eval, not only via the control-plane judge-runner (which evaluates registered JudgeSpec entities post-hoc). So the per-case grader path now builds the Judge from the agent's environment: judgeFromEnv(env) (EVERDICT_JUDGE_MODEL + provider key — OpenAI/LiteLLM or Anthropic — the control plane injects these from tenant secrets into the alloc, same channel as harness model keys), and makeGradersFromEnv(specs, env) is used by both dispatch paths (runCaseJob and the topology ServiceTopologyBackend). When the judge model is configured, a judge spec becomes a real JudgeGrader; when it isn't, the judge spec degrades to a skip score (pass: undefined, detail: "skipped…", same philosophy as the judge-runner) so an ordinary eval never crashes on an unconfigured judge. The low-level makeGraders(specs, {judge}) stays strict (throws) for direct callers.

Verified live (scripts/live/judge-dispatch-e2e.mjs, real LiteLLM): the same case (a scripted harness that runs echo hello > out.txt, plus a judge grader) through runCaseJob — with the judge env set, the real model judges the actual trace (pass=true, score 1.00, "ran a tool command echo hello > out.txt…"); with it unset, the judge grader yields a skip score and the eval still completes. So WebVoyager-style judge presets now score automatically in a normal eval.

Control-plane injection of the judge model into remote allocs ✅

The judge needs a model (which model judges) and a key (provider credential) — different concerns, different channels. The model is per-run config, not a secret, so it travels on the job: CaseJob.judge: {provider?, model} (set by the control plane from workspace/suite policy, like the existing meterUsage). core.judgeEnv(job.judge) maps it to the env contract (EVERDICT_JUDGE_MODEL / EVERDICT_JUDGE_PROVIDER, the same names judgeFromEnv reads), and both backends merge it into the alloc env (buildNomadJob / buildK8sJob), alongside — but separate from — the tenant secret keys (OPENAI_API_KEY etc.) injected via the SecretProvider channel (which was already a no-whitelist passthrough). runCaseJob merges the same judgeEnv(job.judge) so local and remote behave identically.

Verified live (scripts/live/judge-config-injection.mjs, real LiteLLM): with process.env.EVERDICT_JUDGE_MODEL deliberately unset, buildNomadJob puts EVERDICT_JUDGE_MODEL/EVERDICT_JUDGE_PROVIDER in the alloc env (key arriving separately via secretEnv), and runCaseJob — taking the model only from job.judge — runs the real model judge (pass=true, 1.00, "A tool call executed echo hello > out.txt…"). So a per-run judge config reaches a remote alloc end-to-end, with the credential kept on the separate secret channel.

Per-job key resolution (CaseJob.judgeAuth) + dispatch preflight. The backend-level secretEnv channel carries only the WORKSPACE secret tier (it is baked into the cached backend), so a submitter whose provider key was a personal secret used to get a working harness but a silently skipped judge on managed runtimes. JudgeAuthDispatcher (apps/api/src/core/execution, wrapping the shared dispatcher OUTSIDE RuntimeDispatcher) now resolves the credential per job at dispatch — workspace tier first, the submitter's personal key as fallback — onto the transient CaseJob.judgeAuth {apiKey, baseUrl?} (never persisted, same discipline as repoToken/registryAuth); both backends spread judgeAuthEnv(job.judge, job.judgeAuth) AFTER secretEnv so the job-level credential wins. When a judge is configured and NO key is resolvable on a managed target, dispatch fails fast as a config error instead of running the harness and skipping the judge. Self-hosted lanes (self/self:*) are exempt on both counts: the runner judges with its own machine env (own-pays), and workspace keys are never shipped to user machines.

Workspace-default judge config (control plane fills job.judge) ✅

A user shouldn't repeat the judge model on every run — they set it once on the workspace and the control plane fills job.judge automatically (mirroring the existing meterUsage policy). WorkspaceSettings.judge ({provider?, model}, stored in the settings JSONB; model/provider only, never the key) is read by RunService and ScorecardService via a judgeFor(tenant) resolver (wired in main.ts from the WorkspaceSettingsStore), and merged into the job: request override → workspace default → none (none ⇒ the inline judge grader degrades to a skip score). Exposed over HTTP: PUT /workspace/settings {judge} to set the default, and a per-request judge override on POST /runs and POST /scorecards.

Verified live (scripts/live/workspace-judge-default.mjs, real LiteLLM, process.env.EVERDICT_JUDGE_MODEL unset): with a workspace default judge set, RunService.submit for that tenant auto-fills job.judge and the run is graded by the real model judge (pass=true, 1.00, "ran echo hello > out.txt…"); a tenant with no default gets a skip score and the run still succeeds. So a user only puts a judge grader on the case (no model), sets the model once on the workspace, and every run is model-judged. (Open follow-ups: per-repo dependency provisioning for SWE-bench at scale [official prebuilt per-instance Docker images as the env]; GitHub-sourced harness-coupled benchmarks; a prompt env kind for non-browser QA.)

Real OSS harness e2e — aegra (self-hosted LangGraph) ✅

To validate the service-topology model against a real OSS multi-service agent harness (not the stand-in), we ran aegra — an OSS, license-free self-hosted LangGraph server (FastAPI + Postgres checkpoints + Redis + Agent Protocol HTTP API). It's "browser-use-langgraph" minus the browser, and maps 1:1 to HarnessSpec(service): agent-server (aegra) + a postgres checkpoints dependency isolated by thread_id + an HTTP frontDoor (Agent Protocol: assistant → thread → run).

Verified e2e: aegra's ReAct agent answered a task using our model (workclaw LiteLLM gpt-5.4-mini via the clean alias) and followed instructions, in ~2 s — proving the topology's drive + store + model layers against real OSS. Driver/grader: scripts/live/aegra-langgraph.mjs.

Recipe (host LiteLLM on :4000):

git clone https://github.com/aegra/aegra && cd aegra
# .env: OPENAI_API_KEY=<litellm key>, OPENAI_BASE_URL=http://172.17.0.1:4000, MODEL=openai/gpt-5.4-mini
docker compose up -d --build
docker network connect bridge aegra-aegra-1   # only the default docker bridge (172.17.0.1) reaches the
                                              # host's host-network LiteLLM (compose/kind subnets are blocked)
node scripts/live/aegra-langgraph.mjs

Gotchas: use the gpt-5.4-mini alias (no chatgpt/ prefix — else litellm hijacks it into a ChatGPT-OAuth device-code login that hangs in containers); the harness reaches the host LiteLLM only via the default bridge gateway 172.17.0.1.

Driven through ServiceTopologyBackend ✅

scripts/live/service-topology-aegra.mjs runs a real EvalCase through our ServiceTopologyBackend against aegra — using only the backend's injection points (runtime / submit / traceSource / graders), no package changes. The full path executes: dispatch → ensureTopology (external aegra endpoint) → provisionBrowserEnv (no-op, no browser target) → submit (Agent-Protocol frontDoor: assistant→thread→run/wait, with the backend's per-run thread_id = aegra's Postgres-checkpoint isolation key) → traceSource (the harness's run/wait response messages → TraceEvent[]) → grade. Verified: answer-ok: pass — the agent answered via gpt-5.4-mini and followed instructions. This proves the orchestrator-agnostic backend drives a real OSS service-harness end-to-end with per-run isolation + grading; the only synthetic part is the runtime (points at the already-running aegra instead of deploying it via NomadTopologyRuntime/K8sTopologyRuntime).

With a real browser environment ✅ (browser-use-langgraph shape)

scripts/live/service-topology-aegra-browser.mjs adds the per-case browser target — the missing piece that makes this an actual browser-use harness. A real chromedp/headless-shell (Chromium, CDP :9222) is the per-case browser; a LangGraph browser_agent graph in aegra (scripts/live/aegra-browser-agent/graph.py, Playwright connect_over_cdp) drives it; Everdict observes the same browser and grades it. Full path: dispatch → ensureTopology(aegra) → provisionBrowserEnv(per-case chromedp CDP) → submit (Agent-Protocol

• the backend's browser_cdp_url in config.configurable) → the agent navigates/extracts via CDP → traceSource(response) + browser.snapshot() (the chromedp /json/list → {url, dom}) → grade.

Verified (gpt-5.4-mini): the agent navigated to https://example.com, answered "...Example Domain...DONE", and Everdict's browser snapshot was {url: "https://example.com/", dom: "Example Domain"} → browser-url: pass (agent moved the shared browser) + answer-ok: pass. So the topology now exercises a real browser target + DOM/URL grading, on the same orchestrator-agnostic ServiceTopologyBackend.

aegra setup for the browser graph: copy scripts/live/aegra-browser-agent/ into aegra's examples/browser_agent/, register "browser_agent": "./examples/browser_agent/graph.py:graph" in aegra.json, pip install playwright (as root; connect_over_cdp needs no browser binary), restart. The graph forces a writable HOME and splits MODEL=openai/gpt-5.4-mini into init_chat_model(name, model_provider=provider).

Dependency provisioning — stores deployed by the runtime ✅

A real stateful harness (aegra = LangGraph + Postgres checkpoints + Redis) can't run unless its stores exist. The topology builders previously deployed only spec.services and assumed external/shared stores (via storeEnv URLs). Now K8sTopologyRuntime({provisionDependencies:true}) brings up the declared dependencies[] itself — see the provisionDependencies bullet above. Verified live on kind (scripts/live/topology-deps-k8s.mjs): ensureTopology deployed deps-demo-postgres + deps-demo-redis alongside the front-door, the front-door pod's env carried the auto-wired DATABASE_URL=postgresql://everdict:everdict@deps-demo-postgres:5432/everdict + REDIS_URL=redis://deps-demo-redis:6379, and a pg_isready -h deps-demo-postgres probe confirmed the store is reachable by its Service DNS in-cluster (accepting connections) — i.e. the same URL the services get actually connects. buildNomadTopologyJob renders matching dependency task groups (dynamic store port) for parity; the Nomad runtime's service→store endpoint wiring (host:port discovery → storeEnv) is the remaining follow-up (K8s is build-time via DNS, Nomad needs runtime discovery).

Next: deploy the full aegra+chromedp topology via K8sTopologyRuntime (now that the runtime provisions PG+Redis) — needs the aegra image loaded into the node + the aegra pod reaching the host LiteLLM (the hostNetwork+default-bridge trick from the aider-on-kind recipe) — and fold the Agent-Protocol multi-step drive into a reusable ServiceHarness.

Real browser-use front-door ✅

Beyond the LangGraph (aegra) harness, the browser-use agent library (v0.13.1) now runs as a service-topology front-door — a second, independent harness shape proving the backend is harness-agnostic. scripts/live/Dockerfile.browseruse bakes browser-use + aiohttp onto the Playwright Python base; 0.13 drives the base image's /ms-playwright chromium via cdp_use (the playwright module isn't even installed), so browseruse_server.py passes executable_path = that chromium to avoid any runtime download. browseruse_server.py exposes the front-door contract: GET /health, POST /runs {task, browser_cdp_url} (blocks until the agent finishes), GET /observe (last visited URL + extracted text). The agent uses browser_use.ChatOpenAI pointed at the LiteLLM proxy, use_vision=False, headless + --no-sandbox.

Verified live (scripts/live/browseruse-topology-drive.mjs): the real ServiceTopologyBackend.dispatch drove this front-door end-to-end — ensureTopology → provisionBrowserEnv → POST /runs (per-run wiring) → trace fetch → snapshot (mapped from /observe to a BrowserSnapshot) → grade. A real headless Chromium, driven by a real LLM (gpt-5.4-mini via LiteLLM), navigated to https://example.com and read its heading: snapshot.url = https://example.com/ and the extracted DOM contained Example Domain, so url-matches + dom-contains both PASS deterministically (no VLM needed). Orchestrator deploy is already proven (kind + Nomad above), so this run pins the runtime to a local-docker inline TopologyRuntime and closes the backend path with a genuine browser-use image — the last "is it a real agent driving a real browser?" rung, not a stub.

Three follow-ups then hardened it (browseruse-topology-drive.mjs local-docker, browseruse-topology-k8s.mjs on kind):

• Interactive multi-step. The front-door also serves GET /form (a search input + Submit button) and GET /result?q=…. The task — "go to /form, type 'everdict eval', click Search, report the heading" — forces a real navigate → input_text → click sequence. Verified: action_names() = [navigate, input, click, done], final snapshot.url = …/result?q=everdict+eval, so url-matches ([?&]q=everdict) + dom-contains (Results for everdict) PASS. Real DOM interaction, not just a navigation.
• Real trace pull + steps/cost. browseruse_server.py wraps the LLM in browser-use's TokenCost (register_llm → get_usage_summary) and, after each run, emits OTLP spans to Jaeger keyed by the run's trace id: one llm_call span carrying the real token counts and one tool_call span per real action. The trace id is derived from the wiring — the backend's newRunId is overridden to a 32-hex string, so thread_id = run-<32hex> reaches the front-door, which uses <32hex> as the OTLP trace id; the backend's OtelTraceSource.fetch(runId=<32hex>) then pulls that exact trace from Jaeger (with ingest-lag retry). Live: llm_call=1 (model=gpt-5.4-mini, in≈17.5k / out≈0.6k tokens — real), tool_call=4, so the steps grader scores the real action count and cost runs on the real trace (USD = 0: the proxy model isn't in browser-use's public pricing DB, so tokens are real but cost isn't computed — reported honestly, not faked).
• On a real orchestrator (kind). K8sTopologyRuntime.ensureTopology deploys the same browser-use image as a Deployment+Service (image kind load-ed; per-pod env injected via the runtime's storeEnv), waits for rollout (ready 1/1), and port-forwards to discover the front-door. The pod reaches the host LiteLLM at 172.17.0.1:4000 (kind node joined to the default bridge, the aider-on-kind recipe) and emits OTLP to Jaeger's bridge IP :4318; the host pulls the trace from :16686. Same interactive task, same deterministic + trace grades PASS — closing the orchestrator-deploy path for a real browser-use harness, not only the local-docker backend path.

Three more axes then closed it out:

• Both orchestrators (Nomad too). browseruse-topology-nomad.mjs is the K8s script with the runtime swapped for NomadTopologyRuntime — same backend, harness, task, env. ensureTopology registers the front-door job, waits for the alloc to run, and discovers the dynamic host:port; per-pod env rides the runtime's storeEnv (same field as K8s). The Nomad docker task reaches the host LiteLLM at 172.17.0.1:4000 and emits OTLP to Jaeger at 172.17.0.5:4318 (default-bridge IPs — no kind load needed; Nomad's docker driver uses the local image). Live: interactive form PASS, trace pulled (llm_call=1 gpt-5.4-mini in=17527/out=656, tool_call=4), cost USD computed. So the orchestrator-agnostic backend deploys + drives + grades a real browser-use harness on kind and Nomad by swapping only the runtime.
• External real site + success rate. browseruse-realsite.mjs drops the container's own form for a live external site: the task navigates to en.wikipedia.org, searches "Web scraping", and opens the article. Run N times with a stronger model (chatgpt/gpt-5.4) it reports a pass rate — measured 3/3 (100%), each run a real navigate → search → article (5 actions), final url = …/wiki/Web_scraping, url-matches + dom-contains PASS. Real internet, not a local stub.
• Real USD cost (③). browseruse_server.py now computes cost = real_tokens × price/token, where the price comes from LiteLLM /model/info (the operator's configured price) and falls back to an operator-set env (BROWSERUSE_PRICE_IN/OUT). It emits that USD on the llm_call span's gen_ai.usage.cost, so the cost grader sums real USD off the pulled trace. Honest caveat: these proxy models have no price configured in LiteLLM (/model/info returns 0), so the runs use an operator-supplied reference price ($0.15/$0.60 per 1M tokens) — the tokens are real, the price is an operator input (exactly how cost works in production), the USD is real arithmetic (e.g. Nomad run usd=0.00302265; Wikipedia runs $0.0060–0.0079). Not faked: when the operator configures real LiteLLM pricing, that value is used instead.

Then product-shaped it across three more axes (all live):

• Multi-case scorecard + A/B (browseruse-scorecard.mjs). A 3-case dataset (two container-form searches + one Wikipedia article) runs through two harness versions — browseruse@mini (gpt-5.4-mini) and browseruse@gpt5.4 (chatgpt/gpt-5.4) — collecting CaseResult[] into a Scorecard per version. summarizeScorecard aggregates per-metric pass-rate + mean cost/steps; diffScorecards does the A/B by objective pass transitions plus metric deltas. Live: both 100% url/dom pass, tool_calls mean 4.33, and the diff surfaces the cost gap — mean usd 0.003976 → 0.004751 (gpt-5.4 ~20% pricier for the same outcome), no regressions/improvements. The exact control-plane runSuite → summarize → diff shape, on real browser-use.
• Per-tenant isolation (browseruse-isolation-k8s.mjs). The backend resolves tenant → TrustZone (staticTrustZones), asserts hardened isolation, and K8sTopologyRuntime.ensureTopology(spec, zone) deploys each tenant's warm topology into a dedicated namespace with a per-zone NetworkPolicy. Live with two tenants: acme → everdict-acme, globex → everdict-globex, each with its own browseruse-agent Deployment and a distinct front-door endpoint (warm pools are never shared across tenants), each with networkpolicy/everdict-zone-ingress applied; both drove the interactive form under their own zone and PASS. (On kind the default kindnet applies but doesn't enforce NetworkPolicy — enforcement needs Calico/Cilium; the namespace boundary is real either way.)
• Web dashboard rendering. The run + scorecard case views now render browser snapshots: the run page shows the agent's final URL + a DOM/extracted excerpt (alongside the existing scores — which already include steps/cost — and the trace timeline of llm_call/tool_call events), and the scorecard per-case card shows the final URL. The run/scorecard entity schemas gained optional url/dom on the snapshot; apps/web stays on prettier+eslint (tsc + eslint green).

Then closed the loop on three fronts (all live):

• Web rendering, full-stack screenshot. web-seed-server.mjs boots the real control-plane HTTP surface (buildServer + InMemoryRunStore/InMemoryScorecardStore) seeded with a representative browser-use run + scorecard (values from this session's live runs), and the real apps/web dashboard (dev auth: KEYCLOAK_CLIENT_ID= empty → keycloakConfigured=false) renders it. Captured screenshots of /dashboard/runs/:id (scores answer-match/steps/cost, the llm_call → navigate/input/click/done → message trace timeline, and the browser snapshot: final URL + DOM excerpt) and /dashboard/scorecards/:id (per-metric aggregate + per-case browser badge + final URL). The render consumes exactly the shape the live CaseResults produce.
• NetworkPolicy enforcement (Calico). browseruse-isolation-np.mjs runs the two-tenant deploy on the Calico cluster kind-everdict-np (vs kindnet which only applies policy). Live: acme/globex each in their own namespace and driving PASS, then a curl pod proves enforcement — acme → acme (same-ns) = REACHABLE, acme → globex browseruse-agent service (cross-tenant) = BLOCKED. The tenant boundary is real at the network layer, not just declared.
• WebVoyager benchmark adapter, live. importWebVoyager (already in @everdict/datasets) maps a WebVoyager-format sample (examples/benchmarks/webvoyager-sample.jsonl: web_name/ques/web/answer) into browser cases (task=ques, env.startUrl=web, graders answer-match/steps/judge). browseruse-webvoyager.mjs runs them through the real browser-use harness → Scorecard. To grade the answer, browseruse_server.py now also emits a message span (output.value = the agent's final answer) so spansToTraceEvents produces an assistant message and answer-match reads it off the pulled trace. Live: 3/3 answer-match pass (Web scraping / Example Domain / Vector database), summarizeScorecard reporting the pass rate + mean steps. OSWorld (desktop) and now WebVoyager (web), both live through browser-use.

Three more, all live:

• Scorecard A/B in the dashboard. The existing /dashboard/scorecards/compare page renders the API's GET /scorecards/diff (diffScorecards). web-seed-server.mjs seeds two comparable browser-use scorecards (browseruse@mini vs browseruse@gpt5.4, same case ids, gpt5.4 fixing a hard case) and the real dashboard renders the comparison — captured a screenshot showing the metric table (answer_match 0.50 → 1.00 ▲+0.50, usd ▲), 0 regressions, and 1 improvement (hard-task · answer_match 0 → 1). The objective-pass-transition diff, on real browser-use scorecards.

• WebVoyager judge grading (official method). Real WebVoyager has no answer field — the official benchmark judges the trajectory (GPT-4V). browseruse-webvoyager-judge.mjs turns on the LiteLLM judge (EVERDICT_JUDGE_MODEL → makeGradersFromEnv/judgeFromEnv builds a JudgeGrader that scores trace + dom against a WebVoyager rubric) — browseruse_server.py's message span (the agent's final answer) feeds the judge. On the sample (WV_SOURCE=sample): 3/3 judge pass with reasoning, agreeing with answer-match.

• Real WebVoyager at scale + failure analysis. WV_SOURCE=real downloads the actual WebVoyager_data.jsonl (643 tasks / 15 sites) and round-robins WV_N tasks across benign info-lookup sites. Live (6 tasks, judge=gpt-5.4-mini, agent=chatgpt/gpt-5.4): judge pass 67% — ArXiv / BBC News / Cambridge Dictionary / Wolfram Alpha (derivative = 11.2, correct) PASS; GitHub + Huggingface FAIL, and the judge's reasons are honest (Huggingface: the agent fell back to a Bing search and never verified the model's update date). Real benchmark, real sites, judge-graded — pass rate reflects task difficulty, not a fixture.

• VLM judge (official WebVoyager GPT-4V style). The text judge above scores trace + dom; the official WebVoyager judges a screenshot. BrowserSnapshot gained an optional screenshot (base64, mirroring os-use) and resolveScreenshot now resolves it for browser snapshots, so a JudgeGrader with useScreenshot: true passes the image to the VLM. browseruse_server.py with BROWSERUSE_VISION=1 runs the agent with use_vision and returns the final-page screenshot (base64) on /observe; the snapshot carries it (and the web dashboard renders it inline via the existing osUseShotSrc). Live (JUDGE_VISION=1, sample): the judge received a real screenshot per case (376KB / 27KB / 328KB) and its reasoning explicitly cites it ("the screenshot matches example.com"; "the final DOM and screenshot show … 'Vector database'"), 3/3 pass. So a browser-use trajectory is now gradable the official way — a VLM over the end-state screenshot.

• Benchmark-scale WebVoyager A/B (browseruse-webvoyager-ab.mjs). Pulls the real WebVoyager_data.jsonl, round-robins WV_N tasks across diverse sites, and runs the same task set through two models (browseruse@mini / browseruse@gpt5.4) → a Scorecard each, with a per-site pass-rate breakdown (the web_name tag) and diffScorecards for the model A/B. Live (6 sites): both models judge-pass 5/6 (ArXiv / BBC News / Cambridge Dictionary / GitHub / Wolfram Alpha pass; Huggingface fails on both — the agent consistently detours to a Bing search); the diff shows tool_calls 5.83 → 6.67 (gpt-5.4 takes more steps) and judge mean 0.778 → 0.800, with no pass transitions. Honest, benchmark-shaped.

• Unified desktop + web report (unified-report.mjs). One report spanning two different harness shapes through the same CaseResult → Scorecard → summarize flow: a desktop track (OSWorld via runCaseJob + the os-use command harness — mousepad creates a file, graded by a VLM judge and a command/state grader) and a web track (WebVoyager via ServiceTopologyBackend + the browser-use service harness). Live: the desktop case's authoritative state grader PASSes (test -f note.txt && grep confirms the file was written) while the VLM judge is cautious (a pixel screenshot can't confirm an on-disk save — the documented reason os-use grades on state); the web track is 2/2. The point isn't the numbers — it's that one harness/infra-agnostic runtime emits a single report over desktop and web benchmarks.

Three more, all live:

• Authoritative case-pass (caseVerdict/scorecardPassRate, @everdict/domain). A case's pass shouldn't let an advisory VLM judge override a ground-truth grader. caseVerdict decides by priority — state/tests_pass (ground-truth) > answer_match/url_matches/dom_contains (objective) > judge (only when no objective grader). scorecardPassRate aggregates it. The unified report re-ran with this: the OSWorld case (state PASS / judge FAIL) now counts PASS, so combined desktop+web went 2/3 → 3/3. Unit-tested; unified-report.mjs uses it.

• Unified report in the dashboard (/dashboard/report). A web page (FSD) groups all succeeded scorecards by track (desktop/web, inferred from dataset/harness id), fetches each full record, and shows per-track + combined case-pass using a web-side mirror of caseVerdict. Screenshot: COMBINED 86% (6/7), desktop os-use/OSWorld 1/1 (the OSWorld scorecard's state-PASS/judge-FAIL case shows all pass — the authoritative rule made visible in the UI), web 5/6.

• allowed_domains keeps the agent on-site. browseruse_server.py with BROWSERUSE_RESTRICT_DOMAIN=1 derives the task's domain from its start URL and sets BrowserProfile(allowed_domains=…). Live on the Huggingface task that previously detoured to a Bing search: the agent now stays on huggingface.co (final URL huggingface.co/api/models?…, no off-site hop). Honest caveat — the task still fails, but for a different reason (Hugging Face's human-verification wall blocks the headless agent), not an off-site detour. The fix does exactly what it's for; the remaining failure is anti-bot, surfaced by the judge.

• CAPTCHA-free curation — attributing pass rate to the agent, not anti-bot. A benchmark pass rate is only meaningful if failures reflect the agent, not a verification wall. browseruse-webvoyager-judge.mjs's default site set is now curated to CAPTCHA/login-free informational sites and empirically corrected by a live 8-site run: it scored 5/8, and the 3 failures split into (a) Allrecipes — actually anti-bot (the agent was blocked by an access/verification page and detoured to a search engine), so it's dropped from the curated set, vs (b) BBC News + GitHub — genuine agent-capability misses (it reached the site but didn't fully satisfy the task: the specific article / the most-starred repo). The curated set is now ArXiv, BBC News, Cambridge Dictionary, Coursera, ESPN, GitHub, Wolfram Alpha (excluded for anti-bot: Huggingface, Allrecipes, Amazon, Booking, Google Flights/Map/Search, Apple). On that set the failures are the agent's to own — exactly what a benchmark should measure. (ArXiv / Cambridge / Coursera / ESPN / Wolfram passed; Wolfram even returned the correct derivative 11.2.)

Node provisioning BEFORE the job exists — the seam's shape (downstream report §5.2, design decision)

exec.provision renders as a prestart task inside the service's own alloc today, and that is the right default: it covers every case where the runtime the preparation needs already exists on the node. What it cannot cover is preparation that IS what makes the runtime exist — a Windows node with no interpreter yet, a fresh host that must install the browser stack — because a prestart task runs on the node it is preparing, using the very capability it is supposed to create.

Decision: the out-of-band form is exec.provision's second variant, not a separate declaration.

provision?:
  | { mode?: "prestart"; /* today's shape — the default, rendered into the alloc */ }
  | { mode: "node"; /* control-plane-side: runs BEFORE job registration */ }

Reasons, in order of weight:

1. The declaration stays with the thing it provisions. A separate top-level declaration re-creates the two-halves-never-meet class this same report names in §3.2 (frontDoor.contextId vs the trace source's correlateTag): one document, two fields, no rule connecting them. A union at the exec site keeps "what this service needs before it can run" one sentence.
2. Renderers already narrow per form — the current fork pattern. The Nomad/K8s builders render the prestart variant into the alloc exactly as today and ignore mode:"node" BY TYPE; the control-plane provisioner consumes mode:"node" and never sees the prestart shape. Neither can silently half-handle the other.
3. The §3 invariant gets its rule for free: mode:"node" declared against a runtime with no provisioner wired is a declaration the framework cannot act on → a portability warning at registration (node-provision-unwired), never a silent alloc-time death.

The seam (control-plane side, called by the backend before registerJob):

interface NodeProvisioner {
  // Idempotent per (node-class, key): re-runs only when the KEY changes.
  ensure(key: NodeProvisionKey, declaration: NodeProvisionSpec): Promise<void>;
}
type NodeProvisionKey = {
  harnessId: string;
  harnessVersion: string;
  provisionDigest: string; // contentDigest of the declaration — a changed declaration re-provisions
  nodeClass: string;       // the placement constraint the job will carry (never "the whole cluster")
};

Keying by (harness version, contentDigest(declaration)) is the same idiom the manifest pins use: the declaration's bytes are the identity, so an edited declaration re-runs and an identical one never does. The ledger of what ran where is the provisioner impl's (an Ansible-shaped impl keeps its own inventory; a bare SSH impl keeps a per-node marker file) — the seam's contract is only ensure-before-register, keyed by content. What tool executes it is deliberately out of scope, exactly as Backend does not say what runs the alloc.

Tests the implementation must ship (from the report): a node whose provision key changed is re-prepared before the next task starts; a prestart-form spec renders a prestart task and never calls the out-of-band provisioner; and the reverse.